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Today, the works of late nineteenth-century philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche remain some of the world's best-known. Yet at one time, 
Nietzsche's fame came tragically close to infamy. After Nietzsche 
went insane in 1890, his ideas became closely associated with 
Europe's rising Wave of militarism. That same militarism ended in 
the hitherto unparalleled carnage of World War I. A t that time, 
Nietzsche's ideals were widely affiliated with the cause of the war.
After World War I, Europe's most militaristic veterans formed the 
rank-and-file of the new fascist parties. For many, the Great War 
had only intensified the "Nietzschean" idea that life was best 
embodied through violence. Fascists all over Europe espoused 
Nietzsche's warrior ethic. Through Nazism, the most intensified 
form of fascism, the separation of the races was advocated to create 
an atmosphere of eternal tribalistic struggle and militaristic glory. 
Nazis viewed racial dominance as the ultimate virtue. As the 
militarists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had 
done, the Nazis bore the torch of Nietzsche's legacy, and claimed 
him as their consummate ideological forebear.
As World War II ended, the Nazi association with Nietzsche had to 
be clarified. Either Nietzsche had to be dismissed with the other 
ideological foundations of Nazism, or Nietzsche had somehow to be 
rescued. Walter Kaufmann went to great lengths to ensure that 
Nietzsche would no longer be associated with his militaristic 
advocates, especially the Nazis. Kaufmann rescued Nietzsche, but the 
reception of Nietzsche's works has been skewed ever since. In order 
to make Nietzsche palatable in the post-totalitarian West, the 
militaristic, hierarchical, and quasi-racist ideas that Nietzsche 
presented in his works have been systematically ignored. For better 
or worse, the "true" Nietzsche had more in common with the 
twentieth century radical right than the post-war portrayal of him 
has shown. The potential politicized nature of a debate on the topic 
has virtually prevented a debate altogether. This thesis compares the 
textual works of Nietzsche with that of the Nazis in order to explore 
where they in fact do and do not share common ideological ground.
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ABBREVIATIONS FOR NIETZSCHE’S WORKS
The Antichrist (ATC)1 
Beyond Good and Evil (BGE)
The Birth of Tragedy (BT)2 
The Case of Wagner (CW)3 
Ecce Homo (EH)4 
The Gay Science (GSC)
The Geneology of Morals (GM)5 
Nietzsche Contra Wagner (NCW)6 
Twilight of the Idols (TWI)7 
The Will to Power (WP)
Thus Spake Zarathustra (ZAR)8
1 Taken from The Portable Nietzsche
2Taken from The Birth of Tragedy and The Geneology of Morals
3Taken from On the Genology of Morals and Ecce Homo (and other works)
4Taken from On the Genology of Morals and Ecce Homo (and other works)
5 Taken From The Birth of Tragedy and The Geneology of Morals
6Taken from The Portable Nietzsche
7Taken from The Portable Nietzsche
8Taken from The Portable Nietzsche
Chapter I:
Nietzsche, the Nazis, & the Nietzsehe-Nazi Debate
One day, my name will be associated with the memory 
of something tremendous -  a crisis without equal on 
earth, the most profound collision of conscience, a 
decision that was conjured up against everything that 
had been believed, demanded, hallowed so far. I am no 
man, I am dynamite. -- Friedrich Nietzsche (EH 110).
Not until after Nietzsche went insane, in 1890, did the Western 
intellectual world take widespread notice of his tragic insights. No 
thinker has observed more fatal flaws in Western Culture than 
Nietzsche, and no thinker has been more detailed in his description 
of the perceived decline of the West. During the ten years of 
insanity preceding Nietzsche's death, a "Nietzsche cult" emerged 
among the intellectual elite of Europe. Nietzscheans used his works 
to spearhead a movement advocating an end to Western Culture as it 
had hitherto existed. Bourgeois morality, technological life, 
Christianity, and "progress" were attacked by those who would do 
Nietzsche's bidding during his time of decline.
As Nietzsche's popularity grew exponentially throughout the 
1890's, the implications of his thought became a focal point in 
European intellectual life. Nietzsche had witnessed modem man 
slowly but undeniably drifting into a repugnantly contented 
existence, and this conviction led him to some radical conclusions.
In place of the placated "herd animal man," Nietzsche advocated a 
renewed spirituality based on man's more primal predatory instincts. 
For Nietzsche, the predatory drives of a Napoleon or an Alexander 
were noble, and therefore superior to the placid herd impulses of a 
sheep or a slave. If a man does not own-up to his instinct for 
conquering others, Nietzsche thought, his existence could not be 
complete. The increased advocacy of Nietzsche's "warrior ethic" 
resulted in the escalation of militarism as a state of mind. Nietzsche 
had followers all over Europe, but in Germany, his cultural impact 
was remarkable even before his death in 1900.
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Nietzsche's philosophy undoubtedly contributed to the build-up 
leading to World War I. To many Europeans who read his work, 
Nietzsche wished to end a century of pacifism and effeminacy with a 
dazzling display of courage, camaraderie, and conquest. As 
demonstrated in Fritz Stem's Politics o f Cultural Despair, thinkers 
such as Georges Sorel, Paul de Lagarde, and Arthur Moeller van den 
Bruck converted Nietzsche's ideas into the literal advocacy of 
violence, blood-lust, and nationalistic militarism. As resistance to 
Europe's military build-up waned, Nietzsche's legacy conspicuously 
grew in kind.
As World War I began, German soldiers marched to the 
trenches with a copy of the Bible in one coat pocket, and a copy of 
Thus Spake Zarathustra in the other.1 As the war ended, those who 
continued to advocate militarism in Germany, notably the National 
Socialists, also proclaimed Nietzsche as their prime intellectual 
forebear. Before and during World War II, most people, intellectual 
or not, accepted Nietzsche as a natural fit with the rest of the Nazi 
ideological pantheon. As World War II ended, most people equated 
the Nazis' atrocities with the essence of their ideology. After the 
war, Nietzsche's works had to be salvaged from their association 
with a movement perceived to have no value. West of the Iron 
Curtain, those who wished to extinguish the ideological connection 
between Nietzsche and the Nazis found no opposition.
The results of Nietzsche's post-war banishment from the Nazi 
ideological pantheon have been mixed. We still read Nietzsche.
Were his reputation as a proto-Nazi never systematically 
undermined, Nietzsche's reception around the world might have been 
damaged to the point of universal dismissal. On the other hand, 
explaining how the crass and clumsy Nazis were ever able to make 
use of the elegant and articulate Nietzsche is a task that remains 
conspicuously avoided. If Nietzsche were so brilliant and wise, and 
. the Nazis so ignorant and transparent, what person o f sound mind 
could have ever contemplated their intellectual union in the first
1H.L. Mencken, The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (New York: Kennikat 
Press, 1967), 11.
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place? In The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990 (1992), 
Steven Aschheim addresses this very issue, and proposes to
deal with the most straightforward and yet strangely 
underexamined empirical dimension of the relationship: 
locating and analyzing the ways in which Nietzsche was 
integrated into or banished from Nazi discourse, and the 
various functions of Nietzscheanism fulfilled within the 
Reich. . . . The internal strategies involved in this 
transmutation and the extent of its diffusion have to date 
still not been systematically analyzed.2
Textual comparisons between Nietzsche and the Nazis remain 
unwritten as well. For Aschheim, Nietzsche served as a natural and 
vital ideological source for Nazi philosophy. Ignorance of this fact 
can be attributed to the political aberration of the post-war academic 
world. Aschheim addresses the literal use of Nietzsche by the Nazis, 
as well as the Nazis' willful ignorance of his not-so-useful ideas.
This essay will address the same issue, but from a different vantage 
point. While Aschheim documents specific instances of the Nazis' 
use and misuse of Nietzsche, this essay will base its comparison on 
textual evidence to discern exactly where the ideologies do, and do 
not share ground. Aschheim has documented the results of 
Nietzsche's incorporation into the Nazi pantheon. This essay will 
focus more on the spirits of the two philosophies as presented 
through text. In the estimation of this author, only through such 
textual comparisons can arty honest debate be conducted regarding 
whether or not Nietzsche was misappropriated by the National 
Socialists. To set a context for how such a debate might be carried 
out, it will first be useful to examine the historical intellectual 
treatment of the supposed Nietzsche-Nazi link. In order to provide
2Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992), 233.
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an initial context even for this discussion, a synopsis of Nietzsche's 
and the Nazis' ideologies is first in order.
A Brief Look at the Nietzschean Philosophy
It must be said that there is no "one" Nietzschean perspective. 
Yet if a summation of Nietzsche's ideology is possible, it might read 
something like this: "Mankind must make it his goal to become more 
than man, he must become Superman. But first, he must relearn 
what it means to be man." Without question, Nietzsche mainly 
concerned himself with the quality of the individual's existence. His 
insistence that the modem world had less to offer anyone's existence 
than did periods of antiquity channelled his mind into an anomalous, 
though somewhat Romantic direction. Like the Romantics, Nietzsche 
prescribed a harkening-back to past values. Yet Nietzsche's call for 
a future transcendence of all human conditions, and his demand for 
immediate authenticity, set him apart from the Romantic movement. 
Nietzsche understood the impossibility of replicating the culture of 
the ancient Greeks. Since the Greeks, though, no culture had 
succeeded in balancing what Nietzsche called the Apollonian and 
Dionysian impulses which define the natural instincts of man.
Without adherence to these natural instincts, all existence is 
incomplete, or worse, decadent. Cultures only progress in 
proportion to their ability to balance the Apollonian (instinct for 
order) and Dionysian (instinct for chaos) motives. As cultures favor 
the Dionysian, they become increasingly barbaric. As they favor the 
Apollonian, they become increasingly civilized and then overly 
civilized. In either case, as the existences of those within such 
cultures become increasingly imbalanced in one direction or the 
other, the cultures literally become increasingly decadent. Since 
Nietzsche believed that Western Culture had become ridiculously 
lop-sided toward the Apollonian instinct, he believed that the West 
had come to epitomize a culture in decline. Hence, all notions of 
progress in Western Culture are patent illusions.
For Nietzsche, Western regression began with the Socratic 
turn. Before Socrates, the Greeks did not question life. They were
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civilized enough to live in ordered cities, but barbaric enough to 
summarily make war upon each other, own other humans without 
compunction, and accept life as a tragedy in which "improvement" 
and ordering were foreign concepts. The Greeks' governments and 
art set them apart from the barbaric hordes which surrounded them, 
but as the compulsion for "improvement" set in, the ancient Greeks 
became more like domesticated herd animals in which violence must 
be justified, and less like beasts of prey in which violence is an 
unquestioned and natural instinct of life. Through Socratic logic and 
questioning, all that did not "make sense" in Greek culture began to 
be rooted out. The Greeks lost their predatory instinct for hierarchy 
and domination, and turned instead to democratic "inclusiveness." 
Their acceptance of life as myth increasingly gave way to scientific 
explanation. At the same time, they traded a healthy love of war and 
honor for the bloodbath of the Peloponnesian War. With these 
cultural capitulations, the Greeks became at once too civilized and 
too barbaric. For Nietzsche, the individual existence can only be 
realized in a vital culture. Civilization and barbarism to excess are 
equally the enemies of culture. More than any other people, the 
ancient Greeks have come closest to the perfect balance of 
civilization and barbarism, finding Aristotle's golden mean in the 
middle.
Nietzsche maintained that Socratic reason had combined with 
Christianity to form the deadliest of cultural toxins. Germanic and 
Celtic Europe had been excessively barbaric before Christianity, but 
the philosophies of Socrates and Christ anesthetized the vital instincts 
of Europe's peoples to a degree without equal in history.
Christianity, through its universalism and credo of "love thy 
neighbor," robbed Europe of its distinctive cultural identity. Europe 
went straight from the decadence of animal brutality to the 
decadence of a satisfied, neutered herd. For Nietzsche, the Middle 
Ages were characterized not by the Dionysian-Apollonian balance, 
but rather by a sickening mix of extremes of the two. Christendom 
existed as a distasteful combination of Pagan-Germanic barbarism, 
and dogmatic adherence to a slavish ethic which Europeans only 
vaguely understood. In contemporary times, the French Revolution
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has served as a catalyst for the dominance of these herd values, 
though in a secular context. For Nietzsche, exempting a brief period 
during the Renaissance, Europe has come ever-further from finding 
true "Kultur."
Now, with every step taken closer to the perfection of the 
"herd politics" of democracy, the "herd morality" of Christianity, 
and the "herd ethic" of pacifism, Europe takes one step further from 
culture. Even in Nietzsche's day, this could be seen in the increasing 
aversion to hierarchical institutions in society, the increased primacy 
of mass culture, the decadence and lack of focus in art, the 
demonization of the great man, the proliferation of the nation-state, 
socialism, and a civilization grasping ever more tightly to its 
morality in light of the "death of its God." Any solution to the 
European problem must involve a drift more in the direction of 
barbarism, (not to be confused with a total reversion to barbarism), 
myth, chaos, war, aristocratic forms of government, tragedy, 
pitilessness, and predatory instinct. For Europe to progress, it must 
revert to a cultural direction which the modern world now 
recognizes as regression; it must become more Dionysian. The West 
must recover something it has lost.
A Brief Look at the Nazi Ideology
No definition of the "ideology" of National Socialism will 
satisfy everyone. For some, Nazism embodied a modernistic blend 
of national pride, socialistic economic structure, militarism, and a 
genuine attempt to revolt against a perceived decadence in Western 
Culture. For others, the Nazi movement epitomizes sheer 
charlatanism, fear, opportunism, thuggery, and sadism. They see 
Hitler's pathetic if eerily effective ranting and gesturing as emanating 
from a man motivated not by a vision but by an acute sense of 
insecurity and hunger for power. Others may write off the whole 
episode as nothing more or less than bona- fide evil. Without 
question, assessing the Nazi ideology, if such exists, can be done 
effectively only with great care. The Nazis undeniably hoped to 
accomplish much in a positive sense. Their ideology should never be 
dismissed as merely a facad to distract attention from their
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murdering of Jews. Still, their positive points must constantly be 
weighed against their compulsion for lying, their lack of humanity, 
their collective lack of conscience, their blindness to perspective, and 
their respective psychological disorders. Any treatment of Nazism 
which fails to take it seriously as an ideology, o r which fails to 
catalogue its manifold shortcomings, is doomed to incompleteness 
and incaccuracy.
While this section is devoted to the discussion of the Nazi 
ideology, a digression must briefly be made. Nietzsche's distinction 
between "good and evil" and "good and bad" shall be discussed more 
in detail later in the essay, but the whole concept has a direct bearing 
on Nazi ideology, whether an affinity exists between the Nazis and 
Nietzsche or not. For Nietzsche, "evil" is nothing more than a 
fiction born of fear. "One 'knows' today what is good and evil . . . 
that which here glorifies itself with its praising and blaming and calls 
itself good, is the instinct of the herd-animal man" (BGE 125). For 
Nietzsche, anything which could in modem times be conceived of as 
evil comes from culturally biased conceptions of "truth" emanating 
from Christianity or from Socratic logic. Both of these coddle the 
herd instincts, and both are bad. Nietzsche defines "bad" as that 
which is motivated by fear, the herd, and the "slave morality." 
Nietzsche defined the "good" in the ancient sense of the word, that 
which is brave, singular, and literally noble. The Nazis tried  to live 
up to Nietzsche's definition of good, as opposed to bad. And like 
him, they dismissed the entire concept of evil. As the Nazis desired 
to eradicate Christian, Platonic, and humanistic notions of "good" in 
a Nietzschean sense, they also eradicated the possibility of evil, in 
their own minds, as a definitions for their actions.
Like Nietzsche, the Nazis recognized Western Culture as 
singularly decadent, and more than any political movement in 
history, they set out to do something about it. While the 
"philosophy" of the Nazis derived from a great number of sources, 
the well-spring of their ideology came from the rather meager 
source of Hitler himself. Without question, the ultimate source of 
Hitler's ideology stems from his hatred of the Jews. In fact, his 
hatred of the Jews as a race burned far hotter than his hatred of
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Judaism as a religion. With Hitler, all ideology begins with anti- 
Semitism. Still, it must be noted that his ideology does not end there, 
nor does the ideology of the leading Nazi intellectuals. In Mein 
K am pf alone, Hitler relentlessly ascribed the ills of the world to the 
Jews.
Hitler's feelings about the Jews, though, did not prohibit him 
from battling what he perceived the ills of the world to be, 
regardless of their source. Internationalism, Marxism, and pacifism, 
while undoubtedly the work of the international Jewry, were well 
worthy of being hated all on their own. The Nazis believed that 
internationalism had progressively dulled the instinct of nations of 
people to rely upon each other as naturally created communities. 
Marxism threatened to overrun any hope for a natural hierarchy 
among people, and Marxists' false concept of dialectical progress 
promised disastrous consequences. Pacifism had increasingly robbed 
men of their naturally aggressive instincts, and their resulting failure 
as men was corroding the Germanic nuclear family. Though 
hampered by a delusional conspiracy theory about the international 
Jewry, the Nazi ideology stood firmly against internationalism, 
Marxism, and pacifism whether fostered by Jews or not. By 
espousing nationalism (for everyone, not just Germany), a natural 
hierarchy among peoples, and a "healthy" militarism, the Nazis 
believed they offered an alternative system of values for the renewal 
of Western Culture.
Nazism ostensibly fostered a close reciprocal relationship 
between individual and community. The individual existed to serve 
the national community which in turn had a duty to ensure a 
complete existence for the individual. For a man, this meant the 
assurance of work by a socialized government, and the promise of 
masculine warfare through the conquest of "lesser races." Through 
this system, a woman could be ensured that her husband was a 
reliable provider, and a fully masculine man whose instincts were 
sharp and true. A woman could then go about the business of being 
a nurturing wife and mother. With healthy individuals, and healthy, 
natural relationships within the Germanic nuclear household, society 
could benefit both economically and morally. The Nazis' wish to
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strengthen gender roles did not stem from a need to control all 
components of German society. Rather, they believed that adherence 
to orders and hierarchy was a natural, and desirable alternative to 
the Enlightenment's insidious fiction of freedom.
The Nazis stood firmly against Christianity. They maintained 
that no religion could be of value that was bom of a Jew, especially 
one that dulled the racial instincts in favor of universal brotherhood. 
The official Nazi position was simply to combat the influence of the 
Lutheran and Catholic churches with whom they competed for 
ideological influence. The Nazis hoped eventually to undermine 
loyalties to any Christian sect by emphasizing hardness, pitilessness, 
and the lust for conquest amongst all Germanic types. By reverting 
to ancient pagan-Germanic spirituality, the humanitarian, pacifistic, 
universal, and Christian view of the world could eventually be 
phased-out. The Nazis also wished to transcend any and all notions 
of natural, human, or civil rights as dangerous egalitarian fictions 
propagated by the victorious French Revolution, and which found 
their fullest form in the doctrines of Marxism. The Nazis ultimately 
sought to replace the myths of Christianity and the Enlightenment 
with myths pertaining specifically to Germanic metaphysics, which 
were more conducive to the "Germanic soul."
Historical Conceptions of Nietzsche as Nazi and anti-Nazi
Until very recently, the problem with any discussion of the 
Nietzsche-Nazi problem"has been a distinct lack of nuanced 
argumentation. Two rigid positions have been adhered to almost 
without exception. The first, represented by George Lukacs, has 
maintained that no thinker could have possibly been a more articulate 
spokesman for the positions taken by the Nazis. An unabashed 
Marxist during the period of the Nazis' growth in power, "Georg 
Lukacs' definitive Marxist reading . . . portrays Nietzsche 
exclusively as the irrationalist spokesman of the post-1870 
reactionary bourgeoisie and as an inherently proto-fascist thinker, 
father to Nazism."3 Lukacs detested Nietzsche because the two failed
3Steven Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990.4.
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to agree about the nature of dialectical historical development. "The 
weakness and half-heartedness of such 'daring thinkers' as Nietzsche 
or Spengler is that their relativism only abolishes the absolute in 
appearance."4 For Lukacs, Nietzsche's practice of examining 
cultures discretely and independently of linear historical progression, 
is untenable. Lukacs epitomizes that camp among leftists who have 
viewed Nietzsche’s ideas with suspicion since he first published The 
Birth o f Tragedy. Traditionally, the left has viewed Nietzsche's 
perspective as a threat to dialectical thinking and the hope for world 
egalitarianism. Lukacs also represents the traditional leftist 
reception of Nietzsche as an unwelcome advocate of myth, tradition, 
privilege, warfare, and suffering.
The pre-eminent translator of Nietzsche into English, Walter 
Kaufmann, represents the second and equally essentialist school of 
thought on the Nietzsche-Nazi connection. Aschheim points out that 
’ "as the war ended, Nietzsche's role within the politics and culture of 
Germany underwent thorough revision. He was typically 
metamorphosized into what was required for a democratic, anti­
fascist, German identity."5 Similarly, Kaufmann set out after 
World War II to rescue Nietzsche in the English-speaking, world 
from the reputation of "Nazi-Philosopher." He set out to deliver 
Nietzsche in a hyper-individualistic, anti-authoritarian, almost pro- 
democratic package. In his book Nietzsche: Philosopher,
Philologist, Antichrist, Kaufmann makes his position clear: "Hitler 
and the Nazis' brazen adaptation of Nietzsche have confirmed their 
misapprehensions," and their "misappropriations."6 He says nothing 
more of the issue. Yet to fulfill his agenda, many of Nietzsche's 
harsh and politically inexpedient tracts were intentionally softened. 
This fact is now widely acknowledged. Nietzsche scholar Alan 
Megill insists that, "Kaufmann's depoliticization of Nietzsche was 
itself a politicization," and that he "offered an antiseptic, respectable
4Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1971): 187.
5Steven Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990.296.
6Walter Kaufmann, Nietzche: Philosopher. Philologist. Antichrist (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1950): 8.
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Nietzsche -  who would not offend American readers of the 
1950's."7
The two antithetical conceptions of Nietzsche's link with the 
Nazis, espoused by Lukacs and Kaufmann, are equally narrow in 
scope. Most scholars have echoed the sentiments of one or the 
other's position, but in the words of Aschheim, "it should come as no 
surprise that the Nazi-Nietzsche relationship is discussed entirely in 
these narrow terms, as one of out-and-out distortion and radical 
abuse of the master's essentially antipolitical project."8 This 
scintillating topic, patently debatable, has in fact been too politically 
charged to be properly handled. How "entirely narrow" has the 
treatment of this topic been? Seemingly every scholar of either 
Nietzsche or the Nazis has paid curt lip-service to the issue in one 
sense or the other. Few scholars have engaged in nuanced 
discussions. The majority, taking Kaufmann's position, have 
traditionally been no less dogmatic than he.
Georges Batailles, a French Marxist during the interwar and 
post-war era, took exactly the opposite position of his ideological 
compatriot Lukacs. In his famous book On Nietzsche, Batailles 
stated his position succinctly: "Between the ideas of Fascist 
reactionaries and Nietzsche's notions there is more than simple 
difference, there is radical incompatibility."9 In Nietzsche Contra 
Rousseau, Keith Ansell-Pearson makes only one reference to the 
Nazis, and states that the Nazis' "unspeakable evil of the attempted 
mastery of the earth"10 bore no connection to Nietzsche's work. In 
his article "Nietzsche's attitude toward the Jews," Michael Duffy 
makes the questionable assertion that Nietzsche is "strongly and 
consistently anti-anti Semitic,"11 In Nietzsche, the Last Antipolitical 
German, Peter Bergmann insists that the fictitious Nietzsche-Nazi
7Alan Megill, "Historicizing Nietzsche? Paradoxes and Lessons of a Hard Case,"
Journal of the History of Ideas 68, no.l (March 1996): 115.
8Steven Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany. 1890-1990.4.
9Georges Batailles, On Nietzsche (New York: Paragon House, 1992), 170.
10Keith Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge U.
Press, 1991), 1.
11 Michael Duffy and Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward the Jews,"
Tounal of the History of Ideas 49, no.2 (1990), 317.
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link is due only to "misconceptions about Nietzsche's political and 
racial views."12 In The -Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, 
prominent Nietzsche scholars Bemd Magnus and R.J. Hollingdale 
state respectively that Nietzsche "was invoked by Fascists and Nazis 
to advance the very things he loathed," and that "the connection 
between Untimely Meditations and National Socialism is invisible to 
the sober reader."13 In Nietzsche in Turin, Leslie Chamberlain 
simply states that Nietzsche was once "absurdly taken for a Nazi."14 
Among scholars of Nazism, George Mosse, in Toward the Final 
Solution: A History of European Racism simply stated that Nazi 
writers "confused Nazi violence with Nietzschean elan," and that 
Nietzsche's "Know Thyself' knew "no nationality or race."15 In The 
Cultural Roots of National Socialism, Hermann Glaser insists that the 
Nazis' use of Nietzsche was "a misinterpretation which bordered on 
deliberate distortion."16
The purpose of this cataloguing is not to point out, with a few 
short quotations, the wild misconceptions of these scholars. Indeed, 
many of the above comments, in and of themselves, are true, but 
they are far from the whole truth. In each of the above examples, 
none of the authors expands upon their opinions that Nietzsche was , 
misappropriated by the Nazis. A quick dismissal of the Nietzsche- 
Nazi link, often to the point of platitude, is the only evident 
treatment of the topic. None of the above authors offer a nuanced or 
evidenced discussion of the issue. This would seem less bizarre were 
it not for the fact that many respected scholars share the exact 
opposite opinion of the above intellectuals, and this fact is well 
known. By taking a rigid stance on the issue of the Nietzsche-Nazi
12Peter Bergmann, Nietzsche: The Last Antipolitical German (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1987), 15.
13Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins, The Cambridge Companion to 
Nietzsche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 176.
14Leslie Chamberlain, Nietzsche in Turin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 
6.
15George L. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism 
(Madison: U Wisconsin Press, 1978), 196.
16Hermann Glaser, The Cultural Roots of National Socialism (Austin:
Universtiy of Texas Press), 9.
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link, scholars take an inherently controversial position. Yet 
mystifyingly, most remain unwilling to actively engage in the 
controversy they are creating.
The same can be said of those who believe in the existence of 
the Nietzsche-Nazi link. In 1950, the same year that Kaufmann 
published Nietzsche: Philosopher, Philologist, Antichrist, Friedrich 
Meinecke published The German Catastrophe in which he asserted 
that "In Nietzsche's realm of ideas, which now began to exert a 
powerful influence over all yearning and restless spirits, there were 
gathered together almost all the noble and ignoble longings which 
filled this period."17 In his article "Heidegger's Nietzsche," Michael 
Gillespie persists with the notion that "Nietzsche's path was bound up 
in Heidegger's view with the ambiguous end of Western thought in 
Nazism."18 Zeev Stemhell, in The Birth o f Fascist Ideology, makes 
clear his opinion that Nietzsche's characterization of the French 
Revolution as "the last great slave rebellion"19 made him a prime 
intellectual forebear to the Fascist ideology. Beyond this role, 
Sternhell has little to say about Nietzsche, and, like the rest, says 
nothing about Nietzsche which might bring his narrow conclusion 
into question.
Perhaps the most vocal intellectual who shares this perspective 
has been Ernst Nolte. In Three Faces of Fascism, Nolte points out 
that like the Nazis, "Nietzsche and the most subtle concepts of his 
philosophy stood in diametric opposition to Marx," and that "the 
concept of (Nietzsche's) 'blond beast' is not a freak— it is the logical 
result of Nietzsche's thought."20 Of all the aforementioned scholars 
from either the Lukacs or Kaufmann perspective, only Nolte 
provides any real substance for his side of the debate. Nolte thinks 
that
17Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), 
24.
18Michael Gillespie, "Heidegger's Nietzsche," Political Theory 15, no.3 (August 
1997): 428.
19Zeev Sternhell, The Birth of Fascist Ideology (Princeton: Princeton 
Universtiy Press, 1994), 250.
20Emst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (New York: Rinker and Winston, 1963): 
442-443.
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Nietzsche is not in any obvious sense the spiritual father 
of fascism; but he was the first to give voice to that 
spiritual focal point toward which all fascism must 
gravitate: the assault on practical and theoretical 
transcendence, for the sake of a 'more beautiful' form 
of life . . . The ultimate aim (of both the Nazis and 
Nietzsche) was a 'supreme culture' of the future . . .
Many decades in advance, Nietzsche provided the 
politically radical anti-Marxism of fascism with its 
original spiritual image, an image of which even Hitler 
never quite showed himself the equal."21
Nolte portrays Nietzsche the same way in Nietzsche and 
Nielzscheanism, but in broader terms. However articulate he may 
be, engaging in this debate still took up only five pages of Nolte's 
book. And like the rest of the aforementioned authors, he never 
gives an ounce of credence to the perspective of the intellectuals on 
the other side of this particular issue.
Only in the 1990's has the conspicuously closed nature of this 
topic become more actively noticed. Alan Megill and Steven 
Aschheim provide excellent examples of this. Their work on 
Nietzsche, and their attitudes toward his relationship with National 
Socialism are neutral but nuanced, based largely on textual evidence, 
and evidently free of dogma or conventional wisdom. Megill sees 
the historic aversion to the Nietzsche-Nazi issue stemming from 
historians' "tendency to shy away from the more complex and 
demanding aspects of Nietzsche's work, indeed, to shy away from 
Nietzsche generally. Once he is safely insane, they find him more 
manageable.''22 While Megill's Nietzsche focuses on creativity and 
renewal, Megill chooses not to ignore the Nietzsche who prescribes 
"evil" and "the destruction of civilization," and who is an overall 
"prophet of extremity." A close reading of the texts rendered Megill 
no other choice. "With increasing frequency people have been 
approaching Nietzsche independently of Kaufmann. They have
21Ibid., 445.
22Alan Megill, "Historicizing Nietzsche? Paradoxes and Lessons of a Hard 
Case," 148.
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become skeptical of Kaufmann's tendency to deny everything in 
Nietzsche that struck him as too extreme and questionable."23
For Aschheim, the labeling of Nietzsche as a proto-Nazi makes 
no sense because so many un-Nazi groups have seemingly found 
common cause in Nietzsche. "Socialism, anarchism, feminism, and 
generational revolt of the young — these were all touched by the 
libertarian magic of Nietzsche."24 While Aschheim views 
Nietzsche's appropriation by these leftist movements as generally 
absurd, Aschheim's Nietzsche could never fit comfortably into any 
single ideology. Aschheim points out Nietzsche's famous quote that 
"I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them," and that "the will to a 
system is a lack of integrity."25 That said, Aschheim believes that if 
any ideology were able to incorporate Nietzsche with any 
consistency, the group hitherto best suited to that purpose must have 
been the Nazis. Aschheim asserts that "Nietzsche provided a fruitful 
source for the themes . . .  for a post-liberal, post-Marxist, national 
regeneration," and that "the ingredients of the socialist Nietzschean 
religion and its volkish counterpart were not always that 
different."26 Aschheim sums up the lack of integrity hitherto 
displayed in the Nietzsche-Nazi debate in the following way:
The dominant postwar images — embodied in the 
opposed representations of George Lukacs and Walter 
Kaufmann -  have either condemned Nietzsche as 
centrally complicit in the Nazi evil or lauded him for 
being unblemished and opposed to all Nazism's 
intentions and actions. Both these approaches were less 
interested in tracing actual historical paths than pursuing 
their own value-laden interpretations. This certainly did 
not constitute good cultural history.27
23Alan Megill, The Prophets of Extremity (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988), 30.
24Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990.90.
25Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, from Steven E. Aschheim, The 
Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990.90.
26Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe. 148,150.
27Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany 1890-1990.315.
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Aschheim argues that the hyper-accentuation of "value-laden 
interpretations" at the end of World War II was an understandable, 
inevitable, perhaps even desirable reaction to the Nazis willful 
inhumanity and their near-victorious assault on time-honored 
Western values. Yet those same value-laden interpretations have 
prevented cultural historians from telling us what actually happened. 
By rescuing Nietzsche from the Nazis, Kaufmann, to a large extent, 
simply gave us a Nietzsche that did not exist.28 Those who opposed 
Kaufmann did so from an equally hyperbolic perspective. When 
emotional issues bum hot, as any issue dealing with the Nazis did at 
the end of World War II, judgment becomes clouded. Now, over a 
half-century since the Nazis have been defeated, Megill and 
Aschheim beckon us to drop our emotional baggage, value-laden 
interpretations, hyperbolic language, and political posturing, and to 
explore the ideological link between Nietzsche and the Nazis as the 
evidence permits. In other words, the task remains of exploring 
those parts of Nietzsche's thought that cut against the National 
Socialist ideology, and those which served as a boon for the Nazis' 
ideological coffers.
28Whenever possible, I have used Kaufmann's translations of Nietzsche. I 
hope that if an ideological link can be identified between Nietzsche and the 
Nazis, even through a repressed Kaufmann translation, that this will add 
credibility to the essay.
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Chapter II:
Nietzsche as the Antithesis of National Socialism
Anyone who claims that Nietzsche's ideology provided the 
perfect fit for the Nazis is either lying or has not read much 
Nietzsche. Among Nietzsche's chief concerns was the individual as 
artist. Nietzsche believed that mass movements inevitably led to 
dogma, never creativity. His hatred of systems of thought, among 
many other reasons, would have led him to reject the Nazi party as 
surely as he would have rejected any other political party. In more 
specific terms, Nietzsche loathed anti-Semitism, race mania, and 
nation-state politics. He hated political organizations. In them he 
found the harbingers of mediocrity. He also found politics boring. 
Each of these topics shall be explored, but perhaps the best place to 
start is with Nietzsche's detestation of both nationalism and socialism.
Nationalism
The Nazis made German nationalism infamous, but German 
nationalism did not begin with the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923. Waves 
of fanatical nationalism have swept through Germany since the 
Napoleonic conquest of 1806. Under the French banner of "liberte, 
egalite, fraternite," freedom came to mean self-determination for the 
German nation. Eventually, the ’’progressive" origins of nationalism 
would become estranged from the more volkish connotations of 
"nation" in the German language. The Nazis, like Nietzsche, would 
come to view the Revolution's legacies of liberty, equality, and 
fraternity as the grave stupidities of the left. The natural result of 
the Revolution's "slave rebellion in morals," (BGE 118) must be to 
stifle heroism, genius, and excellence in all its forms.
While the Nazis clung to the Revolution's original ideal of 
nationalism as self-determination for peoples, Nietzsche condemned 
the whole Revolutionary experiment as a grave, though logical 
outcome of Christianity. The Nazis viewed nationalist exclusivism as 
the antidote to the Enlightenment's poisonous universalism, but 
Nietzsche saw each of these "isms" as various heads emanating from 
the same monster. The Nazis believed that nationalism would rescue
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the German people from the Christian and Enlightenment 
experiments to convert humanity into a single race of pacified herd 
animals. Nietzsche insisted that nationalism professed to counteract 
universalism, but instead created a new and insidiously potent 
compulsion to conform, obey, and become a member of the herd.
These antithetical approaches to nationalism as a concept can 
be illustrated by comparing Nietzsche's and Hitler's attitudes to the 
popular German phrase, "Deutschland, Deutschland liber alles." 
When Nietzsche proclaimed "Deutschland iiber alles, I think that was 
the end of German culture," (TW1 506) he referred to what he saw 
as the growing ubiquity of the German herd mentality. Once, when 
no strong German state existed, German culture took center stage in 
the world. During Nietzsche's time, when the mental, physical, and 
above all spiritual energies of Germany increasingly subordinated 
themselves to the state, he predicted that German culture would 
wither on the vine. As the state grew stronger, fewer and fewer 
Bachs, Mozarts, Kants, Beethovens, Hegels, Goethes, Schillers, and 
Nietzsches would emerge. At best, Germany would get more 
Bismarcks.
For Hitler, "So many times had I sung 'Deutschland liber alles' 
and shouted with full voice 'Heil,' that I considered it almost a 
belated favor that I was now allowed to appear as a witness before 
the tribunal of the Eternal Judge in order to proclaim the truth and 
sincerity of my convictions."1 Hitler believed that if each German 
honored the blood and soil of the fatherland with his deepest 
loyalties, the resulting "convictions" would allow the German people 
to accomplish any goal they set for themselves, particularly the 
conquest of Lebensraum in the east. Hitler did not see the mass 
movement of nationalism in itself, necessarily, as an inhibitor of the 
individual’s creativity. Hitler did not view the participant in massive 
Nazi rallies as a capitulator to the herd-mentality. Hitler viewed the 
capacity of the German people to expand German culture as an 
exercise in creativity on a scale so grand that all Germans could 
claim a share of it for themselves.
1 Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf.212.
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Nietzsche would have responded to this idea with his classic 
assertion that "Culture and the state — one should not deceive oneself 
about this are antagonists . . . All great ages of culture are ages of 
political decline: what is great culturally has always been unpolitical, 
even anti-political" (TWI 569). An analysis of German cultural 
history renders the same conclusion. From the early Middle Ages 
through Jena and Auerstadt, the existence of the Holy Roman Empire 
resulted in the perpetual political disunity of the Germans. Hundreds 
of sovereign principalities maintained a static and divisive network 
of political boundaries. Due to political stagnation, hundreds of 
Germanic cultures and dialects remained hermetically sealed off 
from their neighbors to a degree unique in Europe. Only the Italians 
could rival this German phenomenon. To Nietzsche, Germany's 
political disunity became her culture's saving grace. So long as the 
German princes had controlled Germany, nationalism could not 
flourish. Spanish identity politics produced the inquisition. English 
nationalism produced Parliament, the consummate achievement of 
the slave morality. The nationalism of the French resulted in the 
dogma, rapine, and unparalleled herd mentality of the Revolution. 
For Nietzsche, Germany remained conspicuously free of such 
malignancies so long as she remained free of nationalism. For 
Nietzsche, in the words of Alan Megill, "the present is in a state of 
absolute dereliction, it lacks any redeeming features, anything that 
might allow us to reconcile ourselves to things as they are."2
In other words, that which is most modem, in this case 
nationalism, can only represent an unheralded degree of decadence, 
decline, and nihilism, but certainly not culture. Hitler exempted his 
brand of nationalism from Nietzsche's equation. The Nazis offered 
national cohesion based on virtues forged long before Christianity, 
humanism, the Enlightenment, western decadence, and the modem 
victory of the slave morality. For Hitler, the Holy Roman Empire 
had resulted in "the slow extermination of Germanism,"3 and the 
consequent imposition of Mediterranean-Christian slave morals and
2Alan Megill, The Prophets of Extremity. 33.
3Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf.15.
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laws. Because he advocated a modern version of the Germans' 
ancient pagan-aristocracy, Hitler viewed his "Germanism" as 
satisfying both Nietzsche's admiration for the master morality, and 
his aversion to modem movements and value systems. By 
advocating ancient values, albeit under a nationalist rubric, Hitler 
ostensibly cut off one of the heads of the monster modernity.
Yet Nietzsche would have insisted that many new disfigured 
heads sprout up in nationalism's place. To the extent that 
"Germanism" ever existed, and came much closer to the master than 
to the slave morality, its "modem" version emanated from mere 
caricatures of history. Nietzsche would have deemed Hitler's attempt 
to "revaluate values" as a failure as well. Though based on heroism, 
instinct, and emotionalism, pagan-German barbarism failed to satisfy 
the rational side of man that made him whole. Souls quenched only 
by land, blood, and spectacle could never be truly satisfied. The 
consummation of such a wish would artificially tilt any human 
toward the Dionysian. The Nuremberg rallies eerily epitomized the 
shortcomings of an ethics based primarily on volkish euphoria.
For Nietzsche, the return to an imaginary, organic, pre- 
Christian past was not only unsatisfying and therefore undesirable, it 
was also impossible. The German soul had been crucified on the 
world-oak of Hegel's dialectic, and an entirely new path, not a 
replica of an old one, must be found. Germans could not will their 
"eternal return" through national hysteria, indoctrination, half- 
truths, or a return to a distant point on a path toward a failed future. 
By definition, Nietzsche’s vision of the Germans' (or humanity's) 
renewal would not be attained through an y  ideology born of the 
modem world, nationalism included.
Contrary to what most other people would think, Nietzsche 
and Hitler would have agreed that nationalism has a civilizing effect 
on the individual. For Hitler, this represented the ultimate goal, for 
Nietzsche, the ultimate catastrophe. While conventional wisdom 
maintains that the Nazis epitomized barbarism, Nietzsche would have 
focused on their compulsion toward order, uniformity, obedience,
i .
consistency, and the antiseptic as qualities characterizing an extreme 
form of the Apollonian, or civilizing instinct. For Nietzsche, this
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represented an unhealthy extreme at the polar opposite of Dionysian 
barbarism. It would not have surprised Nietzsche that for Goebbels, 
nationalism meant "the final fulfillment of peace and community . . . 
to form the nation as a community of need, bread, and fate, to end 
the corruption of democracy and international (money)."4 For 
Nietzsche, only decadent cultures attempt to civilize, as they cannot 
envision their own survival without curbing the creative chaos of 
which individuals are capable.
How does it happen that the state will do a host of things 
that the individual would never countenance?— Through 
division of responsibility, of command, and of 
execution. Through the interposition of the virtues of 
obedience, duty, patriotism, and loyalty. Through 
upholding pride, severity, strength, hatred, revenge — in 
short, all typical characteristics that contradict the herd 
type (WP 383).
Nietzsche would have been dismayed at the Nazi will to create order 
in a society which already suffered from an over-abundance of 
Apollonian order. In this sense, the Nazis only represented a 
quickening of the decadence which they sought to overcome.
When Hitler claims that "state citizenship is the most valuable 
document for (a man’s) entire earthly life,"5 he asserts that a 
person's role, as stipulated by the state, is his most definitive 
characteristic. This emblemizes nationalism's destruction of the 
creative will as emphasized by Nietzsche. "This absurd condition of
j
Europe cannot go on much longer! Is there any idea at all behind 
this bovine nationalism? What value can there be now, when 
everything points to wider and more common interests, in 
encouraging this boorish self-conceit" (WP 395)? Nationalism can 
result only in the decline of humanity's likeness to beasts of prey, 
and an increase in its likeness to the ultimate herd animals, cattle. 
The infamous caricature of a German town in Thus Spake
4Robert Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1971), 127.
5Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 659.
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Zarathustra, The Motley Cow, was full of such people. In 
Nietzsche's eyes, nationalism taxes all that is singular and contributes 
only to what is common. As it civilizes, it further contributes to the 
decline of Western Culture.
Socialism
Ernst Nolte pointed out that "Nietzsche and the most subtle 
concepts of his philosophy stood in diametric opposition to Marx."6 
By this, Nolte meant that Marx's ultimate vision of a world of 
classless inclusivity has been countered by no one more potently than 
by Nietzsche, for whom: "socialism glorifies the qualities through 
which man is tame, peaceable, and useful to the herd as real human 
virtues: namely public spirit, benevolence, consideration, 
industriousness, moderation, modesty, forbearance, and pity" (BGE 
171). As one might guess from this quotation, Nietzsche saw little to 
choose between the concepts of nationalism and socialism. They 
were supposedly separated by the right/left dichotomy (nationalism 
vs. internationalism) but both sought greater inclusivity, mass 
culture, an erosion of class hierarchy, minimization of individuality 
(for fear of more Napoleonic egos), the imposition of order (the 
ultimate hindrance to true culture in Europe), and the political 
legislation of values. Nietzsche differed from both Marx and Hitler 
in his consistent defense of the concept of hierarchical privilege for 
every sector of society.
Hitler knew that socialism did not mix perfectly with the other 
ingredients of a supposedly right-wing ideology. In fact, Hitler felt 
compelled to justify his socialism by distinguishing it from the 
socialism of the Marxist tradition. Chief Nazi philosopher Alfred 
Rosenberg concurred with Hitler that nationalism and socialism were 
not necessarily antithetical. Rosenberg possessed an expertise on 
such matters that far exceeded Hitler's. The Nazi intellectual had 
earned Ph.D.'s in both history and philosophy. Also, Rosenberg 
grew up and was educated in Lithuania. Living next to the Soviet 
giant mandated that all intellectual issues take Marxist theory into
6Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism. 442.
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account. Still, Rosenberg supported "Hitler, (who) had come to the 
conclusion that a just socialism had, per se, nothing to do with class 
war and internationalism. To perpetuate class war was wrong . . .
As far as the workers were concerned it was, therefore, a question of 
renouncing this doctrine as well as their opposition both to the 
farmer and the property owner."7 As Hitler viewed Marx as "a 
master magician of the black arts,"8 it might seem odd that he would 
advocate any type of socialism at all. Hitler clearly felt that German 
socialism could be differentiated from the Marxist package of 
internationalism, class warfare, dictatorship by proletariat, and 
dialectical reasoning.
, Again, Nietzsche could never justify socialism under any 
circumstance. He viewed it as a logical step in the continuous 
degradation of Western Culture, nothing more. Socialism obviously 
resulted from the ongoing march of a victorious slave morality. 
Western Culture had become too exhausted to support what 
Nietzsche called "higher types." The slavish multitudes had become 
too docile even to understand higher, instinctual, predatory human 
beings. As a result, everyone becomes increasingly entitled to the 
same rights and the same opportunities. Eventually, all people will 
come more to resemble than to differ from one another. For 
Nietzsche, this was the ultimate, universal goal of Christianity, the 
secular ideal of the French Revolution, and the dialectical promise of 
Marx. All of these represent stepping stones on a path to complete 
degeneracy.
The collective degeneration of man, down to that which 
the socialist dolts and blockheads today see as their 'man 
of the future' - as their ideal! - this degeneration and 
diminution of man to the perfect herd animal (or, as 
they say, to the man of the 'free society'), this 
animalization of man to the pygmy animal of equal 
rights and equal pretensions is possible, there is no 
doubt about that (BGE 127-128)!
7Alfred Rosenberg, The Diaries of Alfred Rosenberg (New York: Ziff-Davis,
1949), 56.
8Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 579.
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As the Nazis ignored Nietzsche's rejection of socialism, they 
implemented an array of programs which,, even by today's standards 
would seem patently "progressive." Ronald Smelser outlines some 
prime examples.
1) A comprehensive welfare state system designed by state planners
2) A society geared to the upward mobility, indeed the 
embourgeoisiement, of workers
3) A mass consumer society orientation with acceptance of 
materialism as a legitimate individual aspiration
4) The full acceptance of urban, industrial society along with its 
concomitants, advanced technology and the rationalization or 
productive processes
5) The acceptance and partial realization of "progressive" labor 
legislation, especially laws protecting youth and women on the job9
Hitler committed himself to eradicating privilege and 
institutionalizing leveling programs within German society, but he 
consistently portrayed himself as the ideological antithesis to Karl 
Marx. "Though 'Socialist,' Hitler presented himself as the savior of 
Western Civilization against Bolshevism, the bulwark of Europe 
against Stalin."10 Hitler ultimately envisioned a goal of "a German 
democracy in contrast to the spineless international one that, in 1918, 
had taken the helm in Germany."11 In contrast, Nietzsche saw 
democracy and socialism as similar strains of the same disease, even 
if dressed up in a "Germanic" costume to pose as something other 
than Western democracy. For him, all modem political systems 
shared the same disfigured origin; all have merely secularized the 
slave morality of the Christians in one form or another. To the 
limited extent that Nietzsche maintained a political vision, he 
harkened back to the aristocratic-warrior culture of the Greek polis.
9Ronald Smelser, How "Modern" were the Nazis? DAF Social Planning and the 
Modernization Question," German Studies Review 13. no.2 (1990): 295.
10Christopher E. Forth, "Nietzsche, Decadence, and Regeneration in France, 
1891-95." Journal of the History of Ideas54.no. 1 (1993): 116.
11 Alfred Rosenberg, The Diaries of Alfred Rosenberg. 130.
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Only the Overman could reattain such a healthy form of 
government, emerging as a "bolt of lightning" from the "dark cloud" 
of modern political institutions.12
Nietzsche's incorporation into the canon of socialist 
intellectuals marks a grand absurdity. Georges Sorel and Benito 
Mussolini began their careers as Marxist ideologues, but came to be 
deeply influenced by Nietzsche. Many other Marxists of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries counted Nietzsche among 
their intellectual influences. Yet now, "leftist" Nietzscheans such as 
Sorel and Mussolini are indisputably included in the canon of the 
right. For more than a century, socialists have tried unsuccessfully 
to wed their philosophy to that of Nietzsche. The more they 
incorporate Nietzsche, as Sorel and Mussolini did, the less "socialist" 
they become. Karl Kraus humorously labeled all attempted 
"Nietzschean Socialists" as "superapes of the coffeehouses."13
Throughout his writings, Nietzsche heaped scorn upon those 
who wished to liberate the proletariat and turn them into 
Ubermenschen. If Nietzsche viewed himself as dynamite, and the 
Supermen as bolts of lightning, the masses of Germany were 
indestructible bastions of uncreativity. Nietzsche believed that no 
mass movement within millennia of the modern age could forge a 
race of Supermen, least of all by the use of socialism. Nietzsche 
regarded the notion of forging such a race among pacified, satisfied, 
equalized proletarians as patently impossible. He envisioned a future 
race of "beasts of prey and the like,"14 ruled by their primal 
instincts, and their independent, cultivated intellects. By either 
criteria, they would be free of any and all moral constraints. 
Liberated from dogma, a race of such ravenous warrior- 
philosophers could never be "socialized."
12Keith Ansell-Pearson, "Who is the Ubermensch? Time, Truth, and Woman in 
Nietzsche," Journal of the History of Ideas 53, no.2 (1992): 323.
13Steven W. Aschheim, "Nietzschean Socialism -  Left and Right, 1890-1933,"
153.
14Ibid., 150.
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Nietzsche Contra Artifice
In The Will to Power, Nietzsche referred to socialists as 
"superficial, envious, three-quarter actors" (WP 77). He certainly 
despised them for their exploitation of what he regarded as an 
inauthentic representation of culture. The state-run socialist utopia 
represents a complete vacuum of culture, not its final victory. But 
Nietzsche's condemnation of socialists only underscores his 
detestation of inauthenticity in general. Many of his most original 
and scornful cultural criticisms stem from his unique ability to 
recognize affectation and hypocrisy where no one else could. Many 
of the Nazis' most cherished "fasci" or symbols were German 
cultural icons previously excoriated by Nietzsche. The most obvious 
of these was the music of Richard Wagner.
Hitler stated in Mein Kampf that "as really great statesmen, but 
also great reformers . . . side by side with Frederick the Great stands 
a  Martin Luther as well as a Richard W agner."15 Hitler idolized in 
Wagner precisely what Nietzsche despised. Wagner mesmerized 
Germany into believing that by rejuvenating their ancient pagan 
instincts, the Germans could use their new-found organic spirituality 
to renew their own culture and possibly the entire West. Through 
opera, Wagner induced his German audience into a feeling of 
nostalgia through dream-like imagery of a heroic Germanic past that 
included foggy forests, echoing, misty mountains, pagan ritual, and 
celestial Nordic tragedy. He gave artistic expression to the Germans' 
near-ubiquitous late nineteenth-century belief in a "Germanic soul." 
Hitler saw Tristan and Isolde 33 times alone. He regarded the 
inducement of the effects of Wagner's opera on the population as 
bona-fide cultural reform, and the effect of a "great reformer."
Nietzsche too had once experienced Hitler's nostalgic 
exhilaration with Wagner. Through his early years as a professor at 
Basel, Nietzsche and Wagner shared a close friendship. Louise 
Elizabeth Bachofen, an acquaintance of Nietzsche's, observed in an 
1872 letter: "I knew Nietzsche in this early period when he was still 
enthused by Wagner. And how  enthused he was! Every Sunday he
15Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 287.
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traveled to Lucerne and returned from these each time filled with his 
God and told me of the splendors he had seen and heard; I believe 
most firmly that his break with Wagner was a deathblow for 
Nietzsche."16 Indeed, Nietzsche's break with Wagner taxed him 
emotionally, but to a degree, it marked a new era in his personal 
philosophy. According to Ansell-Pearson, "Nietzsche's break with 
Wagner is equally a break with the political idealism and cultural 
romanticism of his youth."17
Nietzsche remained enamored with the possibility of rebirth 
through myth, but he came to see Wagnerian myth as sheer 
charlatanism. While Wagner made no secret of his anti-Semitism, 
George Mosse points out that "Wagner's operas were not mired in 
bitterness laCed with hatred of the Jewish race."18 Nietzsche came to 
see much more in Wagner's operas worthy of scorn. Wagner's 
operas professed cultural renewal when in fact, Wagner epitomized 
the seeming inability of German artists to create something new that 
did not depend on cheap imitation. Once Nietzsche realized this, he 
could not salvage his relationship with the Wagner family. How 
and why this change in Nietzsche came to pass remains somewhat of 
a mystery. Still, the mutation in Nietzsche’s intellectual orientation 
is very detectable in his works. In The Case o f Wagner, Nietzsche 
stated that "There is nothing on which Wagner has reflected so much 
as on redemption. Somebody or other always wants to be redeemed: 
nOw a little man, now a little woman — that is his problem" (CW 
460). Nietzsche detected a smallness in the thinking in Wagner, and 
resented that such a smallness could become a prescription of 
renewal for an entire culture. He said in Twilight o f the Idols that in 
certain ages, "art has a right to pure foolishness — as a kind of 
vacation for spirit, wit, and feeling. Wagner understood that. Pure 
foolishness restores" (TWI 532). Late nineteenth century Germany
16Sander L. Gilman, Conversations with Nietzsche: A l ife in the Words of His 
Contemporaries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 50.
17Keith Ansell Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 27.
18George L. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 102.
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was not an age capable of restoration by foolishness. The foolishness 
of modernity had been far too much to overcome already. Instead, 
Nietzsche hoped for an injection of authenticity into an age 
seemingly devoid of it.
Wagnerian artifice apparently found its way into every one of 
Hitler's policies and decisions. The very definition of "fascism" 
originates in "symbolism." Hitler's myths often resembled Wagner's 
portrayals of an arcane Germanic past that never was. Hitler 
incessantly repeated the unique "culture-founding power of 
Germanic blood,"19 only to attempt the forced  foundation of culture 
through state programs. In Wagner's Niebelungenlied, the noble 
tribe of Germanic Niebelungen are destroyed by the wily and 
treacherous Asiatic hordes of Ghengis Khan. Himmler was 
particularly fond of inculcating fear of and pitilessness against "these 
same inferior races, that at one time appeared under the names of 
Huns, Magyars, Tartars, and Mongols, arid which today appear as 
Russians under the banner of Bolshevism."20 The most fundamental 
conviction of both Wagner and Hitler was that Germanic blood could 
not help but create superior culture, and enforce its dominance. 
Nietzsche had always dismissed this way of thinking as absurd, and 
dangerous. "Thus I attacked Wagner—more precisely, the falseness, 
the half-couth instincts" (EH 232) The conviction that Germanic 
culture could not help but reign supreme had resulted in an excuse 
for intellectual laziness that the Germans could ill-afford.
Nietzsche's Disdain for the Germans
Any discussion of Nietzsche's contempt for inauthenticity must 
include some discussion of his disdain for the Germans themselves. 
Nietzsche certainly believed that virtues and vices could distinguish 
one race or ethnic group from another. To him, the Germans' 
differentiating features should serve as an embarrassment to them. 
Nietzsche took for gospel many of the post-Darwinian racial theories 
of his own day, but not the myth of Germanic racial superiority. To
19Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 338.
20Robert Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich . 248.
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the contrary, Nietzsche viewed the singular mark of the Germans to 
be their uniquely disoriented collective spirit. Playing on one of 
Goethe's most famous lines from Faust, Nietzsche insisted that "a 
German who would make bold to say 'two souls, alas, within my 
bosom dwell' would fall short of the truth by a large number of 
souls" (BGE 174). Nietzsche noted the effects of race mixing among 
the supposedly "pure" Germans, and regarded them among the least 
ethnically pure of all European peoples. The Germans also 
maintained a conspicuous genius for Romanticism. Nietzsche 
regarded these traits, and the German will to obey as the 
outcroppings of a people whose souls were in turmoil, and in a 
uniquely desperate search for a foundation.
The Germans are more incomprehensible, more 
incomprehertsive, more full of contradictions, more 
unknown, more incalculable, more surprising, even to 
themselves, than other peoples are . . . It is 
characteristic of the Germans that the question 'what is 
German?' never dies out among them (BGE 174).
Because of their disorientation, the German attachment to the father 
figure in the form of Frederick the Great, Wilhelm I, or Bismarck 
should not be surprising. Nietzsche's criticisms of the Germans left 
no stone unturned. He even castigated their diet. "Add to this the 
virtually bestial drinking habits o f the Germans, and you will 
understand the origin of the German spirit—from distressed 
intestines" (EH 238).
According to Bernd Magnus, during the Third Reich, 
"Nietzschean qualities were simply projected onto idealized 
depictions of the Nordic race,"21 but Nietzsche never believed in a 
romanticized racial archetype with blond hair and blue eyes, standing 
six foot plus, and with an unblemished, chiseled face. Though he 
may have approved of such components once the "Superman" had 
already emerged (Nietzsche possessed a very pronounced aesthetic
21Bemd Magnus, "Nietzsche's Philosophy in 1888: The Will to Power and the 
Ubermensch," Journal of the History of Philosophy 24.no.l (19861:94.
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side), such aesthetic trivialities meant nothing until one started with a 
spiritually superior being. Secondly, Nietzsche never believed that 
the Germans were capable of producing such men, and a religion 
based on such characteristics could perhaps only happen in Germany 
where "the German is acquainted with the hidden path to chaos," and 
the German, above all, "loves his symbol" (BGE 175).
Why did Nietzsche feel compelled to address the issue of 
Germanic racial superiority at all? To a large extent, Wagner, 
Darwin, and H.S Chamberlain emblemize much more than the 
popularization of the myth of Teutonic racial superiority. They 
reflect a quintessentially European view of the world at the end of 
the nineteenth century. Even the "progressive" Marx maintained 
radically racist ideas, especially about his own people, as in "The 
Jewish Question?" At any rate, the subject of the Germans' place in 
the "racial hierarchy" constantly arose in the academic settings of 
Nietzsche's day, and he had occasion to give it much thought. He 
found the whole widespread acceptance of the idea that Germanic 
blood automatically equated to cultural supremacy positively 
mystifying. In a letter to a rabid Germanophile of his day, Theodor 
Fritsch, he stated, "I must confess that the 'German spirit' of our 
times is so alien to me that only with great impatience can I observe 
its mannerism, among which I especially include anti-Semitism."22 
For Nietzsche, race in and of itself was the guarantor of nothing.
This contrasts sharply with Hitler, whose fondest hope for the 
Germans lay in that portion of the peasant population whose blood 
had supposedly not yet mixed with the Slavs and other races. "This 
is the blessing of the failure of complete mixture: that even today we 
still have in our German national body great stocks of Nordic- 
Germanic people who remain unblended, in whom we may see the 
most valuable treasure for our future."23
In the words of Dominick La Capra, "Nietzsche was perhaps 
the first modern thinker to provide a radical critique of both
22Yirmiyahu Yovel, Dark Riddle: Hegel. Nietzsche, and the Tews (University 
Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 1998), 127.
2 3Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 600.
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metaphysical tradition and modem context as 'decadent."24 
Nietzsche's mockery of the Germans extended well beyond the 
artifice of their identity as culturally superior. That represented 
only a portion of their mental handicap to creativity. Wagner 
epitomized the Germans' slavery to myth, and their failure to 
spiritually jettison themselves from Christianity . Western Culture 
could not be refounded while bound by such heavy chains.
"Nietzsche was offended by Wagner's final composition of Parsifal: 
retelling the Grail story, it capitulated, in Nietzsche's view, to the 
Christian moral system."25 One of the primary concerns of both 
Nietzsche and Wagner was the prospect of cultural revolution and 
renewal. Yet for Nietzsche, any proposed renewal could not succeed 
if it were cut from the same, wom-out cultural cloth that needed to 
be replaced. Nietzsche believed that the German lack of creativity 
(of which he came to regard Wagner as the paragon) was endemic, 
bordered on innate, and reduced all of the Germans' attempts at 
cultural renewal to nostalgic imitation. Worst of all, they were not 
even imaginative enough to recognize their own lack of creativity.
If such characterizations of the Germans are correct, Hitler fit 
the mold in many ways. Nietzsche believed that "the historical 
process begins with the master's bloody battle (against his eventual 
slave) and ends in some sense with the modem bourgeois inhabitants 
of contemporary liberal democracies, who pursue material gain 
rather than glory."26 As already noted, a stated position of the 
National Socialist platform was an acceptance of the pursuit of 
economic gain by the individual. Nietzsche believed that any current 
attempted solution to the problem of the decadence of Western 
Culture, particularly one that did not solve a problem as evident as 
materialism, was doomed to failure. Yet Hitler's posturing by way 
of solutions did not end with his economic theories. Hitler, of
24Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts. Contexts, and 
Language (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 97.
2 5Alan Megill, "Historicizing Nietzsche? Paradoxes and Lessons of a Hard 
Case," 120.
26Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon 
Books, 1992), 120.
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course, was one of the world's most unrelenting anti-Semites, yet in 
Mein Kampf, for example, he declared that "the language of the anti- 
Semitic Viennese press was unworthy of the cultural traditions of a 
great race. I was depressed by the memory of certain events in the 
Middle Ages which I did not wish to see repeated."27
Of course, no one better imitated the shameful Jew-hunts of 
the Middle Ages better than Hitler did. When the Nazis assumed 
power in Germany and stated in an official proclamation that "The 
German Government and the German nation are united in the 
determination to carry on a policy of peace, conciliation, and 
understanding as a basis of all decisions and all actions,"28 and that 
too was sheer duplicity. Once,
Hitler invited all the senior generals to a demonstration 
at the Juterborg artillery school, where exact replicas of 
the Czech fortifications had been constructed. An 
infantry attack on an artillery barrage was mounted as 
well. The actual damage was disappointing, but H itler- 
after clambering through the concrete fortifications— 
proclaimed himself astonished by the devastation.29
A complete documentary of the many ways that the Nazis engaged in 
lying and deception, even to themselves, would consume a multi- 
volume series. Suffice it to say that Nietzsche would likely have seen 
in the Nazis a classic German tactic, best demonstrated by Wagner, 
of substituting posture and mania for imaginative, creative, original 
cultural solutions.
Art and the Individual
In many ways, Hitler's conception of culture merely echoed 
Nietzsche's conception of traditional Western oppression as the great 
bane to individuals' creativity. The Nazis' artificial conception of 
culture reflected a distorted view of individual capability. In the
2 7Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 68.
28Robert Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 100.
29Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (New York: Vantage Books, 
1995), 100.
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words of Alan Bullock, "Hitler saw himself, in Nietzsche's term, 'as 
an artist-politician,' the inspired leader who molded the thoughts and 
feelings of the nation and uplifted them into a vision of unity and 
greatness."30 Hitler thought he possessed the right to suppress the 
creative expression of anyone in society based on the overall needs of 
the Volk. He felt that since "the results of art, science, and 
techniques are almost exclusively the creative product of the 
A ryan,"31 that every German maintained the capacity for great art, 
but that the need for agriculture and industry with the society 
mandated withholding of the creative capacity of most. While Hitler 
predictably attributed "ninety per cent of all literary and artistic 
rubbish and theatrical humbug"32 within the Reich to the Jews, he 
never even called for a reactionary, Aryan artistic revolution, as one 
might have expected from an "artist-politician," to demonstrate the 
ubiquity of Germanic artistic genius.
To Nietzsche, "art is that which liberates us from enslavement 
to a moral world-order and affords us the opportunity of creating 
the world anew."33 For Nietzsche, cultural renewal could not 
succeed unless the individuals within the culture were free of moral 
constraint. To be so free, artistic license was required. The Nazis 
substituted for such artistic freedom a state-sponsored campaign of 
"artistic awareness." "Goebbels persuaded Hitler to give him control 
not only over the press, radio, films, and theaters, but also over the 
arts as well, including books, music and the visual arts, all brought 
under the Reich Chamber of Culture."34 After conducting the most 
famous of the student book burnings in May of 1933, Goebbels 
declared that "from these ashes will arise the phoenix of a new 
spirit."35 The "new spirit" to which Goebbels referred was "to 
bring art to the people by pretending that high culture was the
30Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 318.
31Adolph Hitler. Mein Kampf. 397.
32Ibid., 77.
33Keith Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 117.
34Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 318.
35Ibid.
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natural property of the people. Thus, the Nazis tried to attribute a 
popular meaning to the concept of culture and make it seem that in 
the future the Volk would determine the mainstream of cultural 
production. Art was to be the symbol of good and sane 
'norm ality."36
Though in Hitler's words, "the German is the sole owner and 
propagator of a truly artistic mind,"37 he planned to reduce the 
German people's opportunity to create art to the replication of state 
ideology and/or the spoon-feeding of government approved art. It 
says much about the Nazis that the duties of the Minister of Art and 
the Minister of Propaganda were given to the same person,
Goebbels. Art and all of the creative powers of the individual were 
to be harnessed for the benefit of the Volk. Perhaps everything 
singular that could not be absorbed by the commonest dolt had to be 
brought down to the lowest level. Nietzsche found few things more 
abhorrent than the use of art for the literal negation of creativity. 
"What should win our gratitude.-- Only artists, and especially those 
of the theater, have given men eyes and ears to see and hear with 
some pleasure what each man is himself, experiences himself, desires 
himself; only they have taught us to esteem the hero that is concealed 
in everyday characters" (GSC 132-133). For Nietzsche, it was 
precisely the purposelessness of art that made it vital to existence.
Art must be a reflection of the chaotic impulse of Dionysis, a respite 
from the everyday order of civilization. When art becomes 
subsumed in purpose, most particularly in the purposes of the state, 
it speaks to us only of its decadence. "Greek taste.— 'What is 
beautiful in it? asked the surveyor after a performance of Iphigenia; 
'nothing is proved in it" (GSC 136)!
Perhaps the most remembered "artistic" performances of the 
Third Reich were the impassioned and mesmerizing speeches of 
Hitler. Without question, Hitler had some artistic talent, but his 
ability to convey messages found its ultimate outlet through his
3(?Adelheid von Saldern, "Cultural Conflicts, Popular Mass Culture, and the 
Question of Nazi Success: The Eilenriede Motorcycle Races, 1924-1939," German 
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oratorical skills. Hitler admittedly repeated his messages ad nauseum 
for the effect of indoctrination, and with each repetition, the mania 
of the crowd increased. Again, this begs a comparison with 
Nietzsche's, castigations of Wagner.
I know very well what sort of music and art I do not 
w ant-nam ely, the kind that tries to intoxicate the 
audience and to force it to the height of a moment of 
strong and elevated feelings. This kind is designed of 
those everyday souls who in the evening are not like 
victors on their triumphal chariots but rather like tired 
mules who have been whipped too much by life (GSC 
141).
Only in such an imitative atmosphere could the Germans have 
abided the many other Nazi impositions upon their liberties. As 
previously shown, the Nazis wished to dictate to the German people 
exactly what did and did not constitute art. Hitler stated in Mein 
Kam pf that "The movement has to promote the respect for the 
personality by all means; it must never forget that the value of all 
that is human is rooted in the personal value, and that every idea and 
every achievement are the results of the creative force of man, and 
that the admiration for the greatness is not only a tribute of thanks to 
the latter."38 True to his duplicitous nature, Hitler later declared 
that "the state has to appear as the guardian of a thousand years' 
future, in the face of which the wish and the egoism of the individual 
appears as nothing and has to submit."39 Heinrich Himmler's chief 
editorial writer for the SS periodical Das Schwarze Corps stated 
simply that "he who is different is unable to recognize the laws of 
nature."40 Nietzsche dreamt that the assault on Western Culture 
would result in a perfect new venue for creativity. The Nazis' will 
to impose near-total control failed even to make contact with this 
vision.
38Ibid., 488.
39Ibid., 608.
40George L. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution, xx.
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It only befits a movement that tended toward the 
mechanization of the human being to stoop to the worship of 
technology. "Technology was to be transferred from 'civilization' to 
'culture'"41 for the better preservation of the members of the Reich. 
In addition, "technology was to be reconciled with Geist. "42 But for 
Nietzsche, the capacity for self-preservation, either among 
individuals or for the group, should always play a secondary role. 
"The struggle for existence is only an exception, a temporary 
restriction of the will to life. The great and small struggle always 
revolves around superiority, around growth and expansion, around 
power--in accordance with the will to power which is the will of 
life" (GSC 292).
Nietzsche believed that the retention of energies for the 
purpose of survival underscored the weaknesses of both individuals 
and cultures. That survival is today not taken for granted means that 
not enough energy and attention are devoted to living an authentic 
existence. Perhaps the failure of the Nazis to deliver the promise of 
the greater "Dasein" finalized Heidegger's decision to leave the 
party. Nietzsche admired those cultures that provided for the 
cultivation of higher human beings. But the Nazis effectively willed 
to render an entire nation as uncreative as the rank-and-file of their 
party tended to be. According to Bullock, "The predominant tone 
of the party was lower middle class: vulgar, heavily male, and beer 
drinking, chauvinist, xenophobic, authoritarian, anti-Semitic, anti­
intellectual, antiemancipatory, antimodernist."43 If this 
characterization is true, a nation of such men could do nothing to 
improve the overall composition of mankind, let alone become a race 
of Ubermenschen themselves.
Anti-Semitism
Probably the most common way in which Nietzsche has been 
differentiated from the Nazis has been by documenting their
41Adelheid von Saldern, "Cultural Conflicts, Popular Mass Culture, and the
Question of Nazi Success," 323.
42Ibid.
43Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 79.
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respective attitudes toward anti-Semitism. Nietzsche had nothing but 
scorn for anti-Semites, and the Nazis made their living by exploiting 
anti-Semitism. No two positions could stand further apart. Unlike 
the Nazis, Nietzsche made clear distinctions between ancient and 
modem Jews and Judaism. Yet most of Nietzsche's stereotypes made 
reference to long-term cultural developments. In fact, his cultural 
generalizations would not have been possible if not for millennia of 
continuities within Jewish culture. Like the-Nazis, but for far more 
profound historical reasons, Nietzsche generally regarded the Jews as 
morally, culturally, economically, and even intellectually distinct 
from the rest of Europe. Unlike the Nazis, Nietzsche portrayed the 
Jews' distinctiveness in very nuanced and detailed terms.
Nietzsche felt that as "a race still in need of having their heads 
washed first," (GSC 291) the Germans continued to lack the 
intelligence to get over their historic anti-Semitism. He proposed to 
"eject all anti-Semitic ranters from the country" (BGE 183). "Let in 
no more Jews! Thus commands the instinct of a people whose type is 
still weak and undetermined" (BGE 182). For Nietzsche, the Jews 
were a more creative race than the Germans in the sense that they 
had gained an instinctual resiliency in response to historic 
oppression. Nietzsche wrote of their "higher intelligence," their 
holding fast to the "banner of Enlightenment and intellectual 
independence," and their advocacy of a "rational explanation of the 
world. "44 He describes them as a people with "the toughest vital 
energy, " (ATC 593) whose accumulated wisdom had contributed 
irreplaceably to the intellectual supremacy of Europe. "May heaven 
have mercy on the European intellect if one wanted to subtract the 
Jewish intellect from it."45 Nietzsche said that his experiences with 
Jews had "aroused in me the highest expectations from young men of 
this origin."46 As the strongest people in Europe, Nietzsche felt that 
they added an element of "the most conserving power in our 
intensely threatened and insecure Europe" (WP 462). Consequently,
44Michael F. Duffy & Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward the Jews,"
Journal of the History of Ideas 49, no,2 (1988): 304.
45Ibid., 312.
46Ibid., 303.
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if they indeed did  want to be the ruling caste of Europe (as many 
anti-Semites theorized) they easily could, that much was certain. But' 
"that they are not planning and working towards that is equally 
certain" (BGE 182).
Nietzsche's thoughts on the Jews represent an important but 
subordinate aspect of his thought. The Nazi regard for the Jewish 
intellect needs little introduction, and serves as the ultimate source 
for all of their ideology. The thousands o f  comments made by Hitler 
about Jews in Mein Kampf did not contain a single complimentary 
observation. For him, nothing good could ever come from a Jew, 
and everything bad has resulted from Jews. This is the consummate 
anti-Semitism. Hitler went well beyond hating Jews. He convinced 
himself that they were what was wrong with the world. Hitler 
popularized the use of the word Untermenschen as an antithesis to 
Nietzsche's dream of Ubermenschen. For Hitler, the consummate 
race of subhumans were the Jews, so he clearly either did not read 
his Nietzsche closely, or more likely, he simply ignored what he did 
not like.
Hitler's conception of Jews and Judaism encapsulate a great 
number of crude errors and ironies. He claims that in their 
"specifically Jewish way of thinking . .  . intolerance and fanaticism  
incorporates the very Jewish nature."47 In Mein Kampf, Hitler 
repeatedly refers to them variously as "slick, wily, deceptive, 
guileful, shrewd, sly, and cunning." By portraying the Jews as a 
singularly adroit people, he makes his conspicuously spotty evidence 
against them seem more palatable. The Nazis' fear began with a deep 
suspicion of Jewish intellectual life. Hitler said that "their 
intellectual abilities were schooled in the course of centuries. Today 
the Jew is looked upon as 'clever,' and in a certain sense he has been 
so at all times."48 Ultimately, centuries of Jewish deception aimed to 
"break the people's volkish and national spine, in order to make it
47Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf . 67.
48Ibid., 412.
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ripe for the yoke of slavery of international capital and its masters, 
the Jews."49
The contradictory notions that the Jews could make use of 
their cunning through "superior genius,"50 and at the same time 
bottom-feed as Untermenschen is never made clear in Mein Kampf. 
We are merely supposed to have faith that as "the Jew forms the 
strongest contrast to the Aryan,"51 his instincts lean toward 
destruction rather than creation, and internationalism as opposed to 
nationalism. To accomplish his diabolical goals, the Jew mesmerizes 
the mass working populations of the world with the charlatanry of 
the Marxist religion. The "Jewish mind" could be used to explain 
any malevolent development, including the their own guileful plan to 
conquer the world, or the periodic cultural impotence of the German 
people. Says Nazi Foreign Minister Reitlinger, "The advance of 
Jewish influence and of the corrupting Jewish mentality in politics, 
economics, and culture paralyzed the German people's strength and 
will to rise again."52 For some Nazis, such as Ernst Rohm, "Jew 
baiting was merely a highly effective form of drumming up 
prejudice against the hated Republic."53 For most major Nazi 
officials, however, conspiracy theories about the Jews and their 
intellectual challenge were inherent and central to the Nazi view of 
the world.
Among all the peoples of the earth, why did the Nazis single- 
out the Jews for their most venomous invectives, and as objects of 
their revenge? The Nazis understood the Jews to be historically pre­
disposed toward an internationalism, and this, of course, conflicted 
with the interests of the German Volk. Since the Diaspora, the Jews 
had been forced to find homes everywhere but their original 
homeland. Their resultant rootlessness had dulled their national 
instinct. Through internationalism, they wished to rob each nation 
of the world of a connection to its native soil the way that they had
49Ibid., 331.
50Ibid., 446.
51Ibid., 412.
52Robert Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 87.
53Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 414.
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once been robbed. Zionism was used as a cover for more insidious 
international ambitions. Rosenberg formulated this sentiment in his 
Detmold Address on January 15, 1939, as follows: "The Jewry is 
striving today for a Jewish state in Palestine. Not in order to offer a 
home to Jews all over the world, however, but for other reasons: 
world Jewry has to have a little miniature state in order to send 
extraterritorial ministers and representatives to all countries of the 
world and through them to promote its lust for domination."54 
Hitler felt that this was to "prepare the ground for its domination of 
the truly international finance and stock exchange capital."55
Whether under the guise of capitalism, or Marxism, the goal 
of the Jew was the same: he must use politics and ideology to, in the 
words of Goebbels, "devour all peoples."56 He is "tactically clever" 
and "intelligent" enough to pander to "merchant instincts" where he 
can capitalize on them, and to "Bolshevik rhetoric" where it is to his 
benefit.57 Having lost his instinct for nationhood, the "eternal 
wandering Jew" (an oft repeated phrase of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries) had to attain his own progress always at 
the expense of other nations. Exploitation of the other nations of the 
earth could best be accomplished by first eliminating all national 
instincts. This is where the Marxist component of the international 
Jewish conspiracy comes into play. Hitler believed that despite their 
rootlessness, he could "expose the inner connectedness"58 of the 
Jewish people and their link with Bolshevism.
For Hitler, Marx was not singular among Jews in his dream of 
undermining nationhood around the world. Marx is the rule, a mere 
example of what all Jews are about. "In the service of his race . . . 
Karl Marx was really only one among millions who, in the swamp of 
a gradually decomposing world, recognized, with the keen eye of a
54Robert Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 93.
55Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 289.
56Joseph Goebbels, "National Socialism or Bolshevism?," From Edward 
Dimondberg, Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, The Weimar Source Book (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994), 128.
57Ibid., 128.
58Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 424.
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prophet, the most essential poison elements and rendered them into a 
concentrated solution for the quicker destruction of the independent 
existence of the free nations of this earth."59 Hitler acknowledged 
the need to fight Marxism independently of the Jews, insofar as it 
could be construed as a genuine ideology. Yet for Hitler, Marxism 
was nothing but a crafty tool of the conspiring international Jewry. 
As "the personification of the Devil, as the symbol of all evil, 
assumes the living appearance of the Jew,"60 it should come as no 
surprise that "his crown will become the funeral wreath of humanity, 
and once again this planet, empty of mankind, will move through the 
ether as it did thousands of years ago."61 All of this may constitute 
an ideology. Either way, it appears contradictory when compared 
with Hitler's assertion, also in Mein Kampf that "in my opinion, the 
language of the anti-Semitic Viennese press was unworthy of the 
cultural traditions of a great race."62
The malevolent root of this Nazi rhetoric could not contrast 
more sharply with the source of Nietzsche's opinions. Nietzsche felt 
that Jewish creativity stemmed from a cultural tradition of a 
uniquely spiritual people. "Esprit: quality of late races: Jews, 
Frenchmen, Chinese. (The anti-Semites do not forgive the Jews for 
possessing 'spirit1—and money. Anti-Semites—another name for the 
'underprivileged')" (WP 460). The original evidence,of the creative 
spirit of the Jews lay in the beauty of the literature of "The Old 
Testament, the book of divine justice, things and speeches of so 
grand a style that Greek and Indian literature have nothing to set 
beside it. One stands in reverence and trembling" (BGE 79). Within 
this testament lay also a testament to a people capable of cultural 
refinement through tradition and shared wisdom. By "their instinct 
for the chosen," (WP 116) their "ability to elevate their God," (ATC 
616) and "endurance in fearful situations and psychological and
59Ibid., 579.
60Ibid., 447.
61Ibid., 84.
62Ibid., 68.
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spiritual resources,"63 the Jews had developed a "great heroic 
tendency"64 which the other peoples of Europe had yet to 
comprehend.
Nietzsche's as a Detractor of the Jews
In an attempt to rescue Nietzsche from the label of "proto- 
Nazi," many historians and philosophers have made light of the many 
ways in which Nietzsche's piercing vision lent itself to helping the 
Nazis clarify their own often murky ideologies. As an example, 
scholars often circumvent Nietzsche's more unflattering portraits of 
the Jews. Because of his flattering comments regarding the Jews, 
and his detestation of anti-Semites, Nietzsche has often been shrouded 
in such hyperbole as the great "anti-anti Semite." Yet such labels 
willfully steer clear of the evidence. Nietzsche put no group on a 
pedestal above criticism, and the Jews were no exception. He wrote 
for himself, and spared no feelings in the stereotypes that he coined. 
Many of his biting observations offended the sensibilities of people 
during his day. Many continue to offend people who read them.
And while his willingness to promote negative stereotypes should be 
noted, it must also be remembered that were Nietzsche's powers of 
observation less keen, many of the compliments that he bestowed on 
entire peoples would never had been made either. The Nazis' 
portrayals of the Jews were, by-and-large, distorted, biased, 
ignorant, and brimming with animus. Still, history has shown that 
they borrowed heavily from Nietzsche to provide articulation, 
potency, and sting when their own collective intellects often 
produced only platitudes. Though most scholars would agree with 
Michael Duffy's assertion that "Nietzsche's comments on the Jews 
present an important aspect of his thought,"65 the ways in which 
these comments have been influential remains an almost 
systematically avoided topic.
63Michael F. Duffy & Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward the Jews," 
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To Nietzsche, the Jews were "the strangest people in world 
history" (ATC 592). Their history made them strange. Despite 
their resilience, the Jews started on a path toward decadence due to 
the dogma of the Pharisees (ATC 596). After that, Christianity 
resulted from the Jewish historical experience and their feelings of 
ressentiment.66 For Nietzsche, Christians have embodied decadence 
and ressentiment, and these they inherited from the early Jews.
Often spread by such Christians, the Jews' cultural anomalies have 
been developing for thousands of years. Unlike the Nazis, Nietzsche 
did not attribute the Jews' vices to innate racial flaws.
Like all great thinkers, Nietzsche went through a period of 
acute impressionability during which he took in the prevailing ideas 
and attitudes of his day. His relationship with Richard Wagner is a 
key example of this period. Many of his utterances or writings about 
Jews, particularly from this early period, reflect the prevailing, 
though intellectually questionable conventional wisdom of the day 
regarding Jews. Many comments, especially ones made during his 
twenties, can be described only as petty.
Yirmiyahu Yovel's book Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche, and 
the Jews is an excellent source for Nietzsche's seemingly racist 
remarks. It has often been noted that Nietzsche's sister Elizabeth, 
who became Elizabeth Forster-Nietzsche when she married a 
prominent anti-Semite, is largely responsible for the unjust 
reputation Nietzsche has received as a proto-Nazi. It has been said 
that she did all she could to convince the public that Nietzsche's 
ideals were near to her own: she was a rabid nationalist, anti-Semite, 
and was obsessed with eugenics. If her reputation as the distorter of 
Nietzsche is correct, it could not be based on many of the letters 
written by Nietzsche to Elizabeth, especially between age 22 and 28. 
In one such letter, Nietzsche states that "Gersdorff (a friend) and I 
discovered a pub where we can be alone and don't have to enjoy 
melted butter and watch Jewish faces." In a letter to Wagner, when 
he was 25, Nietzsche declared that "Jewish greed" was "one of the
66From Webster's II New College Dictionary. "General resentment and often 
hostility harbored by one person or group against another, e sp . 
chronically  and with no m eans o f direct expression.
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"causes of Germany's decline." Again to Wagner in 1870, he 
complained of "Jewishness in music," and "the Judaized press."
Yovel also cites an instance in which Nietzsche avoided speaking to 
an acquaintance, one Dr. Volkmann, "because he was dressed with an 
appalling lack of taste, like some theatrical Jew," and stated in a 
letter to his mother that a fellow member of a hiking expedition was 
"unfortunately a Jew."67
The above quotations appear in Yovel's chapter entitled "The 
Anti-Anti Semite," and Yovel dismisses his own citations as 
indicative only of the "immature" Nietzsche. He chooses instead to 
emphasize the break that Nietzsche made with his past when he 
passed into his "mature" stage in which no anti-Semitic or even anti- 
Jewish tracts could supposedly be found. Yovel's position is 
indicative of the puzzlingly skewed history of interpreting Nietzsche. 
Whether the Nazis willfully ignored material that lacked utility to 
their cause, or whether today's intellectuals willfully ignore material 
by Nietzsche that does not suit his reinvented image since World War 
II, distorted assertions have been made about the character of 
Nietzsche's writing that lack legitimacy in light of a close reading of 
his works. This includes Yovel's insistence that Nietzsche ceased his 
criticism of the Jews during his "mature" period. In The Antichrist 
alone (1888), Nietzsche not only made anti-Jewish comments, but 
notably un-intellectual ones. Whether referring to "superlative little 
Jews, ripe for every kind of madhouse," or the apostle Paul— "the 
eternal wandering Jew par excellence," or simply asserting that Jews 
"smell bad," a clear pattern is shown to exist throughout Nietzsche's 
writings (ATC 625,622,649). Nietzsche clearly made a wide variety 
of comments about the Jews, both positive and negative and varying 
in quality, from the beginning of his intellectual career to the end.
Despite voluminous evidence to the contrary, Nietzsche 
scholars have been persistent in taking the position, emblemized here 
by Michael Duffy, that Nietzsche is "strongly and consistently anti-
67Yirmiyahu Yovel, Dark Riddle: Hegel. Nietzsche, and the Tews. 120-121. All 
of the quotations from this paragraph can be found on these pages in Yovel’s 
book.
44
anti-Semitic."68 Mosse sanguinely points out that Nietzsche's 1879 
article "A word about our Jews,' placed his prestige at the disposal of 
the anti-Semitic movement."69 Yovel too paints the "Nietzsche as the 
great anti-anti-Semite" portrait with as broad a stroke as possible. It 
was the Old Testament Judaism, whose "grandeur Nietzsche adored; 
the 'priestly' Judaism of the Second Temple, which he profoundly 
despised and condemned as the parent of Christian culture; and the 
post-Christian Judaism of the Jews in the Diaspora and in modem 
times, whom he defended, admired, and saw as a healing ingredient 
in his 'new Europe."70 This characterization too shall be shown as 
highly exaggerated.
A vital distinction needs to be made. While Nietzsche had 
nothing good to say about anti-Semites or anti-Semitism, his largely 
negative portrayal of Jews and Judaism should disqualify him from 
the title of "the father of all anti-anti-Semites." The willful 
ignorance about Nietzsche's unflattering remarks regarding the Jews 
is curious and suspicious. It marks a major component of the 
selective citation of his works since World War II, which has led to a 
skewed reception of his philosophy in modem times.
Yovel's characterization of Nietzsche's reception of the Jews as 
patently positive, excepting the period of the Second Temple, is 
easily disproven. While Nietzsche made distinctions between ancient 
and modem Jews and Judaism, he also draws attention to historic 
continuities. For instance, Nietzsche does assert that the 
characteristics of "impotence and envious hatred" distinguish "the 
Jews of the prophetic era" from Jews of other eras.71 Yet Nietzsche 
concurs with Tacitus that the Jews are "a people born for slavery" 
(BGE 118). Hence, he finds no irony in the fact that the Jews, 
"greedy, slavish," and "motivated by impotence, and envious hatred," 
were responsible for "inaugurating the slave rebellion in morals."
68Michael F. Duffy & Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward the Jews,"
317. 1
69George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins o f rhp
Third Reich (New York: Grosset and Dunalp, 1964), 200.
70Yirmiyahu Yovel, Dark Riddle: Hegel. Nietzsche, and the Tews. 117.
71 Michael F. Duffy & Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward the Jews,"
312.
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Nietzsche calls them "the best haters there have ever been."72 
Because "in every Jew's possession" lies the "coldest self-possession," 
the Jews have set a new standard for the infliction of revenge upon 
their enemies.73 Due to their "ressentiment," it was the Jews' 
"revenge to elevate Jesus extravagantly, and to sever him from 
themselves," and through his martyrdom to impose the slave 
morality on the entire world. By such methods have "superlative 
little Jews" (ATC 622) perfected the art of revenge as "an 
extenuation of their usury."74 These opinions are not directed at one 
limited period in Jewish history. These are characterizations of the 
Jews as they have developed culturally from antiquity to the modem 
day. Duffy, who characterizes Nietzsche as "consistently anti-anti 
Semitic," mystifyingly makes the following generalization about 
Nietzsche's writings on the Jews. "Nietzsche not only demonstrated a 
dislike of the German Jews of his day, he also expressed an antipathy 
toward Judaism in general."75 No such thinker can seriously be 
regarded as the consummate "anti-anti-Semite."
While castigating all (including the Jews) who have historically 
been driven by a thirst for revenge, Nietzsche does express his 
understanding for the Jews’ vengefulness. In The Antichrist, 
Nietzsche explains his absolution of the Jews on the grounds that 
their vengefulness signposts a "non plus ultra of historic genius" 
(ATC 592). In The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche justifies the Jews' 
vengeance as necessary for "the preservation of their self-respect.76 
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche even refers to "revengefulness" 
as a "strong, high," and "passionate" drive perhaps worthy of 
"cultivation" (BGE 183). Numerous other instances could be cited. 
But more than anything, Nietzsche despised ressentiment, and he saw 
it more in the Jews than in any other people. It was the Jewish 
resentment against stronger races at the time of their ancient decay
72Ibid., 305,307,309,310.
73Ibid., 305.
74Ibid., 305.
75Ibid., 302
76Ibid., 305.
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that resulted in their "slave revolt in morals," Christianity. This was 
a cultural blow from which the world may never recover.
"In the hands of the Jewish priests the great age in the history 
of Israel became an age of decay" (ATC 596). Herein began the 
chicanery of the Jews that led to the poisonous slave revolt in morals. 
According to Nietzsche, the Jewish priesthood falsified the concept 
of God, (ATC 595) culminating in the "history of Israel as the 
denaturing of all values" (ATC 594). By virtue of their emerging 
impotence among peoples, "their hatred grew to monstrous and 
uncanny proportions."77 To Nietzsche, this never would have 
happened had they not lost the vital instinct for hierarchy, caste, and 
race. Since they did, they predictably founded Christianity,
representing the counter-movement to any morality of 
breeding, of race, of privilege: it is the anti-Aryan 
religion par excellence. Christianity—the revaluation of 
all Aryan values, the victory of chandala values, the 
gospel preached to the poor and base, the general revolt 
of all the downtrodden, the wretched, the failures, the 
less favored, against "race": the undying chandala hatred 
as the religion o f  /ove (TWI 505).
In other words, the decadence of the ancient Jews has given way to 
the victory of a Judeo-Christian tradition which has assaulted the 
"master morality" and everything noble, and has ensured a perpetual 
victory parade for the morality of the slave. For this, Nietzsche 
would never forgive the ancient Jews, or their descendants. "It was 
the Jews who started the slave revolt in morals; a revolt with two 
millennia of history behind it, which w'e have lost sight of today 
simply because it has triumphed so completely" (GM 168). This 
strikingly presages a definitively Nazi conception of the Jews: Their 
corrosive effects on culture must be feared all the more because they 
are hidden from view.
Throughout his writings, Nietzsche consistently characterizes 
the Jews as a people with a time-honored tradition of cunning and
77Friedrich Nietzsche, The Geneology of Morals, from Michael F. Duffy & 
Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude Toward the Jews," 313.
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guile. "It is really high time to ask: What good actor today is not—a 
Jew" (WP 317)? Nietzsche comes back to this idea throughout The 
Will to Power, even in Kaufmann's translation.
People of the basest origin, in part rabble, outcasts not 
only from respectable society, raised away from even 
the smell of culture, without discipline, without 
knowledge, without the remotest suspicion that there is 
such a thing as conscience in spiritual matters; simply—
Jews: with an instinctive ability to create an advantage, 
a means of seduction out of every superstitious 
supposition, out of ignorance itself (WP 117).
To a certain extent, Nietzsche associated the instinct for race 
and caste with the instinct for culture. The same could be said of his 
distinguished colleague and friend Jacob Burckhardt, but no one 
seems to be insisting that Burckhardt was a proto-Nazi. Nietzsche 
simply felt that the Jews had traded a degree of their culture for a 
degree of guile that opposed all nobility. As they lost their caste 
system, they lost their instinct for aristocracy as the "good." 
Consequently, that which had hitherto been slavish had been "bad," 
but now became the "good." We still live with this legacy.
The Jews tried to prevail after they had lost two of their 
castes, that of the warrior and that of the peasant; in this 
sense they are the 'castrated': they have the priests—and 
then immediately the chandala . . .  the origin of 
Christianity . . . Because they knew the warrior only as 
their master, they brought into their religion enmity 
toward the noble, toward the exalted and proud, toward 
power, toward the ruling orders . . . That is why the 
French Revolution is the daughter and continuation of 
Christianity—its instincts are against caste, against the 
noble, against the last privileges (WP 111).
All of this discussion of Jewish cultural traits must not be confused 
with the Nazi desire to confer upon the Jews innate racial flaws. For 
Nietzsche, the Jews' cultural virtues accompany profound, 
historically nurtured cultural imperfections. A slavish guile,
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developed in response to the demise of their caste instinct, has made 
the Jews the epitome of incompleteness in human existence, 
especially in the West. This has culminated in a "disbelief in 'higher 
man'" (ATC 599). Again, this relates back to how poorly, as a 
people, they compare with the ancient Greeks and the Greek outlook 
on life.
The Greeks . . .  in their desire to invent some dignity 
for sacrilege and to incorporate nobility in it, they 
invented tragedy—an art form and a pleasure that have 
remained essentially and profoundly foreign to the Jew, 
in spite of all his poetic gifts and his sense for the 
sublime. . . . The Jews feel that they are the chosen 
people among all the nations because they are the moral 
genius among nations (because they had a more 
profound contempt for the human being in themselves 
than any other people) . . . .  Nobility had surrendered 
all of its power and had become contemptible (GSC 
188).
The level of nuance present in Nietzsche's and the Nazis' 
respective intellectual treatments of the Jews should be enough to 
distinguish them. Regardless of his intentions, however, Nietzsche's 
treatment of the Jews lent itself to the Nazis' ideology in two 
fundamental ways. By painting such a detailed picture of the Jews, 
Nietzsche created an articulate catalogue of detailed slogans about the 
Jews. This became dangerous in the hands of anyone who wished to 
edit creatively Nietzsche's overall portrait of them. Secondly, by 
justifying what he viewed as historic Jewish vengefulness through the 
ressentiment of the slave morality, Nietzsche made the idea of 
vengeance upon the Jews seem more justifiable. Large tracts of 
Nietzsche's work run directly counter to Nazi thought. Other tracts, 
including some on the Jews, could easily be incorporated by the 
Nazis with no need to misappropriate his words.
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Chapter Hit
Nietzsche as the Embodiment of National Socialism
The issue of anti-Semitism, while important, represents only 
one possible category of comparison between the ideologies of 
Nietzsche and the Nazis. Certainly, racially motivated Nazi anti- 
Semitism differs sharply from Nietzsche's negative cultural 
observations about a people for whom he also had much admiration. 
Yet the problem with the traditional interpretation of the issue, for 
those who have dismissed the Nietzsche-Nazi link, has been to focus 
almost exclusively on their respective treatments of the Jews. 
Nietzsche's and the Nazi's respective treatments of the Jews are 
obviously distinguishable. Still, when a comparison of their 
ideologies is fimited to this particular topic, a specious dismissal of 
their ideological connection seems inevitably to follow. Another 
relevant issue, almost completely ignored by scholars, is a 
comparison of Nietzsche's and the Nazis' respective visions for a 
future European society.
Nietzsche called for new cultures built on the foundation of 
creative individuals. The Nazis demanded that individuals conform 
and relinquish their creative powers for the betterment of the group. 
Nietzsche detested the increasing conformity and blandness of the 
individual in mass society. For him, socialism consummated this 
trend. Hitler demanded socialism so that the individual would be 
easier to mold. Nietzsche saw German society, conformist and 
susceptible to dogma, capitulating to simple-minded explanations of 
race-thinking that led to a shallow and unconstructive nationalism. 
Hitler exploited and quickened feelings of extreme national pride to 
acquire a maniacal following, and wished to reduce all thinking to 
issues of race. Nietzsche relentlessly criticized the Germans. Hitler 
insisted that they were the master race. Nietzsche had mixed feelings 
about the Jews, as he had about all peoples. Hitler saw everything 
wrong in the world emanating from the Jews. Nietzsche dreamed of 
a race cultured to be great, not indoctrinated to be so. The Nazis' 
truths were normally rigid and narrow, Nietzsche's truths were
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nuanced. Clearly, the Nazis did not merely emulate Nietzsche. 
Clearly, many wide ideological chasms separate their ideologies.
Consequently, it may seem shocking to notice how very much 
common ground they shared ideologically, nonetheless. The 
meaning of Steven Aschheim's assertion that "Nietzsche provided a 
fruitful source for . . . visions of a post-liberal, post-Marxist, 
national regeneration"1 might seem mystifying given the material 
examined so far. Yet while Nietzsche detested his contemporary 
political organizations as harbingers of mediocrity, and while he 
found politics boring, he knew that many would try to incorporate 
his ideas into politics. In the words of Zeev Stemhell, "Even the 
most abstract ideas of Nietzsche and Heidegger had immediate 
political application, and they knew it."2 Nietzsche believed that the 
realization of his ideas would not be possible for many millennia, but 
he tempted the brave to fuse an heroic past with a supra-human 
future. Nietzsche stood for hierarchy, warrior aristocracy, the 
isolated community (in the spirit of the polis) and to a degree, for 
the sanctity of race. More strikingly, he advocated slavery, violence, 
pitilessness, and more "evil." While Nietzsche did not believe in the 
existence of evil, he believed that what Western Culture had hitherto 
perceived as evil was in short supply in modem Europe. To the 
extent that the Nazis shared these values with Nietzsche, a world of 
likenesses between them remains to be explored, despite their more 
obvious differences.
The Essence of the Vision
The 1980's, and especially the 1990's have been witness to an 
explosion in Nietzsche scholarship. Alan Megill and Steven 
Aschheim have emerged among the most potent breakers of the 
disfigured molds into which Nietzsche has been placed since World 
War II. While not technically a "Nietzsche scholar," Francis 
Fukuyama dealt heavily with Nietzsche in his famous 1992 book, The 
End of History and the Last Man,. Perhaps better than anyone,
1Steven E. Aschheim, "Nietzschean Socialism -- Left and Right," 148.
2Peter Bergmann, Nietzsche. The Last Antipolitical German. 252.
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Fukuyama has made clear the extent of Nietzsche's detestation for 
modernity in all its forms. "It was Nietzsche's greatest fear that 'the 
American way of life' should be victorious."3 Much of the 
extremity in Nietzsche's writing can be traced back to his belief that 
anything would be better than liberal-democratic societies, and their 
pacifism, presumption of universal equality, and feminism.
Nietzsche had no doubt that only such societies could emerge in the 
wake of the absolute and irreversible victory of the slave morality. 
For Nietzsche, no greater catastrophe could befall mankind.
Francis Fukuyama focuses on the undemocratic, anti-liberal, 
militaristic, anti-feminist, anti-egalitarian Nietzsche. Fukuyama sees 
Nietzsche's agenda as a warning of an impending global uni-culture 
of liberal-democratic "men without chests, a society of bourgeois 
who aspired to nothing more than their own comfortable self- 
preservation."4 Whether one despises or admires liberal-democratic 
forms of government, one must acknowledge that their hegemony 
has progressed even since the time of Nietzsche. And Fukuyama 
draws attention to how close we have come to the realization of 
Nietzsche's nightmare. Now, "One has to learn a new set of 
democratic values: to be 'participant,' 'rational,' 'secular,' 'mobile,' 
'empathetic,' and 'tolerant."5 These are all qualities of Fukuyama's 
"Last Men," and "virtues" that Nietzsche despised as the source of 
"good" in the herd, slave morality. These "democratic" values, for 
Nietzsche, and for that matter Hitler, can only be attained at the 
expense of noble, aristocratic, master values. Says Fukuyama, "The 
desire for glory (among people like Alexander, Caesar, or 
Napoleon), and that inordinate stirring to be better than others— is 
no longer an acceptable way to describe one's goals. It is in fact a 
characteristic we attribute to people that we don't like . . . like 
Hitler."6 For Nietzsche, the desire for glory, and to be better than 
others, is the most indispensable ingredient for the preservation or
3Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. 320.
4Ibid., 188.
5Ibid., 24.
6 Ibid., 190.
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creation of higher types, and the most natural instinct in our human 
nature.
There are certain strong and dangerous drives, such as 
enterprisingness, foolhardiness, revengefulness, craft, 
rapacity, ambition . . . mightily developed and cultivated 
. . . these drives are now felt to be doubly dangerous. . . 
step by step the herd instinct draws its conclusions . . . 
here again fear is the mother of morality (BGE 183).
To the "men without chests," Fukuyama points out that 
Nietzsche vastly prefers the ancient pagans, the "beasts with red 
cheeks."7 Such men took what they wanted instinctively, paid high 
prices for the preservation of their pride, and had no conception 
whatsoever of what "humanity" or "human rights" could possibly 
mean. Nietzsche observed that as history witnessed these "beasts 
with red cheeks" giving way to "men without chests," progressively 
fewer Caesars, Napoleons, Bachs and Mozarts were being produced. 
Nothing could be worse. Consequently, anything that stood in the 
way of such a world must be preferable to what is happening. 
Fukuyama observes that among modem political ideologies, only the 
Fascist-Nazi perspective has proclaimed a desire to reverse the 
perceived corrosive effects of "liberty, equality, and fraternity."
In Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche taught that man is a 
"bridge" between the animals and "Ubermenschen," translated as 
either "Overmen" or "Supermen." "Man is something that shall be 
overcome. What have you done to overcome him? . . . What is ape 
to man? A laughingstock or a painful embarrassment. And man 
shall be just that for the Overman" (ZAR 124). The emergence of 
this race of "Superbeings" represented Nietzsche's highest hope. As 
previously alluded to, such people would appear as a cross between a 
pride of lions, a cultured aristocracy, and a tribe of artistic geniuses. 
They would act on instinct, and most importantly, always without 
remorse or guilt. They would take slaves for the greater fulfillment 
of their own lives, and would recognize and maintain an instinct for
7 Ibid., 162.
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race and breeding as required for their culture's preservation. Since 
going back is impossible, the unforseeable aesthetic splendor of the 
Supermen would have no equivalent in history. Yet culturally, a 
Superman's regard for himself and those of his ethnic culture would 
resemble the ancient Greeks, only intensified. "I sought in history 
the beginnings of this construction of reverse ideals (the concepts 
'pagan,' 'classical,1 'noble' newly discovered and expounded—)" (WP > 
537). Still, humanity's low point, modernity, must somehow be 
overcome.
Men not high or hard enough for the artistic 
refashioning of mankind . . . have hitherto ruled over 
the destiny of Europe, until at last a shrunken, almost 
ludicrous species, a herd animal, something full of good 
will, sickly and mediocre has been bred, the European 
of today (BGE 89).
Social Darwinism
Nazi ethics are easily traced to the late nineteenth-century 
application of science to sociology. Then, thinkers such as H.S. 
Chamberlain applied Darwin's idea of natural selection to the study 
of humans to explain the seeming chasms of cultural development 
between the races. As Darwin had created a hierarchy of plants and 
animals in the natural world, Herbert Spencer and other Social 
Darwinists popularized a ranking of the human races, based 
ostensibly on their respective capacity for culture and intelligence.
Social Darwinism benefited the twentieth century reactionary right • 
in a number of ways.
One, the budding nineteenth century impulse to harmonize the 
races, led by the abolitionists, was severely undermined. Racism was 
no longer hampered by its irrational motivations in an increasingly 
rationalizing world. Science had logicized and seemingly confirmed 
the elitist suspicions of white racists. Two, the universal idea of a 
single mankind, advanced in various ways by liberals, Christians, and 
socialists alike, now had to overcome a new enemy in the form of 
scientific racism. For Marxists in particular, scientific racism 
contradicted the eternal truth of dialectical progress. Achieving the
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proletarian utopia depended on people's increased recognition of 
humanity's kinship. Increased recognition of racial difference 
worked against the crusade for world unity. Three, by demarcating 
races into species in the way that one would classify animals, 
scientific racism made competition between races, rather than 
cooperation between them, seem perfectly natural. Survival of the 
fittest came to mean survival of the fittest species, or race. This 
point of view helped fuel the militarism of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, as European national groups also came to 
view each other in a competition for survival. Taken to its logical 
conclusion, Social Darwinism can only end in widespread 
"interspecies" conflict, and war.
The implications of scientific racism severely antagonized all 
universal values, but particularly the ideals of the left. Pacifism^ 
egalitarianism, human brotherhood, and the ideal of the sovereign 
individual all conflicted with the militarism, tribalism, idealization of 
hierarchy, and intensified nationalism that logically progressed from 
Spencer's model. By positing such a striking antipode to the ideals 
of the far left, scientific racism naturally contributed significantly to 
the twentieth century reactionary right.
The application of the ethic of "survival of the fittest" in Nazi 
Germany extended Well beyond the infamous Nazi advocacy of racial 
warfare. Hitler even euthanized 70 000 Germans. In the words of 
George Mosse, this showed definitively that "the Nazis took the idea 
of 'unworthy' life seriously."8 Similarly for Nietzsche, "the struggle 
against the brutal instincts is different from the struggle against the 
sick instincts" (WP 138). For leftists, both sickness and brutality are 
curable diseases, at least in theory. For both Nietzsche and Hitler, 
sickness must be attacked as evidence of weakness. Brutality is 
almost the opposite of sickness as it represents a fundamental instinct, 
and the "fitness" and dominance of the brutalizer.
The Social Darwinists were Nietzsche's contemporaries.
While his condemnation of anti-Semites remained relentless until His 
death, Nietzsche seldom if ever condemns Social Darwinism.
8George Mosse, Toward the Final Solution. 219.
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Nietzsche criticized all, including the scientific racists, who wished to 
rationalize everything in an already logocentric culture. Yet in the 
sense that "'natural' has come to mean the same as 'contemptible,' 
and 'bad'" (WP 141), Nietzsche and the scientific racists found 
common cause by reconsidering the role of instinct in human 
endeavors. Both wished to reintroduce the concept of universal 
warfare, and eradicate the ideal of universal welfare. Natural 
selection should once again define human relationships. Says 
Nietzsche
In all the countries of Europe and likewise in America 
there exists at present a very narrow, enclosed, chained 
up sp ec ies of spirits who desire practically the opposite 
of that which informs our aims and in s tin c ts  . . . 
levellers, these falsely named 'free spirits' - eloquent 
and tirelessly scribbling slaves for the democratic taste 
and its 'modern ideas. What with all their might they 
would like to strive after is the universal green pasture 
happiness of the herd, with security, safety, comfort and 
an easier life for all, and sym pathy  fo r all 
th a t  su ffe rs  (BGE 71-72).
The return to instinct, and the turning away from "the universal 
green happiness of the herd" demonstrates Nietzsche's will to 
permanently infuse competition, violence, and hierarchy into human 
existence. During Nietzsche's day, these ideals were remarkably 
fresh. Without question, the search for a nature-based understanding 
of humanity, shared by Nietzsche and the Social Darwinists, began 
near a remarkably similar date.
Race
Ideological similarities between Hitler and Nietzsche are 
manifold, and many more shall be explored. But for an initial 
analysis of the: common ground between their visions, the issue of 
race must first be addressed. Had Nietzsche not tasted of the race- 
thinking debauch of his day, no comparison of his ideas with those of 
the Nazis would be warranted. Since with the Nazis all thinking 
began with race-thinking, a vacuum of such material in Nietzsche's
56
writings would reduce any shared intellectual ground between the 
two to sheer accident. As shown, Nietzsche categorically dismissed 
anti-Semitism, and all maniacal nationalism. Still, he loathed these 
trends in German culture not because he felt them to be evil, but 
because dogmatic adherence to race-thinking inhibits creativity. In 
fact, Nietzsche indisputably believed in the concept of racial value. 
Virtually all Europeans during the late nineteenth century, including 
Nietzsche, took the value of race for granted. Nietzsche only 
objected to an obsession with race, and an all-encompassing, mind- 
numbing pride in it. Race can still have value as the creation of, or 
foundation for great men. "Napoleon made nationalism possible, 
that is its excuse" (WP 469).
Nietzsche did not view the Germans as his potential "Master 
Race." In fact, he believed that no race currently existing on this 
earth could turn itself into the Ubermenschen. Nietzsche also 
thought that the Master Race could under no circumstances 
materialize for thousands of years. "It is nothing to be wondered at 
that a couple of millennia are needed to re-establish contact—a couple 
of millennia mean little!" (WP 537) But the tenor of Nietzsche's 
language lends itself to a cornucopia of race-thinking like no other 
thinker in history. While Nietzsche did not center his thought 
around race, he extensively articulated the ideological enticements of 
race. Nietzsche's writings on race were not intended for proving the 
superiority of one extant race over another. Rather, Nietzsche 
extolled the role of race as an indispensable piece in the puzzle of 
great cultures.
All of the conjecture of his day about "race" lacked a most 
fundamental ingredient, the necessity of breeding. All of the pseudo­
scientific postulates, and circular arguments about racial hierarchy 
meant nothing while Europeans paid no attention to breeding. 
Nietzsche viewed the will to breed stronger types as a pillar upon 
which all vital cultures have been built, and shall always be built. 
Inattention to breeding has contributed to the end of great cultures. 
This position is made clear in Twilight o f the Idols. "The 
philosophers are the decedents of Greek culture, the counter­
movement to the ancient, noble taste (to the agnostic instinct, to the
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polis, to the value of race, to the authority of descent)" (TWI 559). 
The passing of the cleanliness of the Greek aristocracy's bloodlines 
marked the inevitable decline of their culture. "For spirit alone does 
not make noble; rather, there must be something to ennoble the 
spirit.— What then is required? Blood" (WP 496). To Nietzsche, the 
noble instinct for breeding had been vanquished by the decadent 
spirit of democracy. The fragile "soul" of the ancient Greeks 
decayed as their inter-caste marriage taboos withered. Nietzsche 
maintained the common nineteenth century intellectual position that 
ethnic groups and races enjoyed discrete and fragile "souls." The 
anomalies of ancient Greek culture could be explained, in part, by 
the anomaly of their genetics.
Partly due to his relationship with Wagner, Nietzsche espoused 
a belief in the supremacy of the "Aryan soul" at the beginning of this 
academic career. He maintains this idea throughout The Birth o f  
Tragedy. "The legend of Prometheus is indigenous to the entire 
community of Aryan races and attests to their prevailing talent for 
profound and tragic vision" (BT 63). As shown, many scholars have 
attributed such attitudes to the folly of the "immature" Nietzsche 
before he broke free of the influence of Wagner. Nietzsche’s 
position certainly faded from that of the typical racist as his career 
progressed, but he never stopped portraying ethnic stereotypes, in 
the Wagnerian sense, as the supposed mirrors of mystical ethnic 
souls.
"Evil men have no songs. How is it then that the Russians have 
songs" (TWI 469). Here is an odd phrase coming from a self- 
proclaimed opponent of German nationalism. But it sheds light on 
Nietzsche's ideological relationship with the Nazis. For who except 
those on the far-right have unabashedly used ethnic stereotypes as a
s
concrete feature of their thought? And Nietzsche crafts a stereotype 
for each of the nations of Europe.
The English genius coarsens and makes natural 
everything it takes up; The French makes thin, 
simplifies, logicizes, adorns; The German confuses, 
compromises, confounds and moralizes; The Italian has 
made by far the freest and subtlest use of what it has
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borrowed, and introduced a hundred times more than it 
took out of it: as the richest genius which had the most 
to bestow (WP 438-439).
Lest one read these characterizations as mere cultural stereotypes, 
Nietzsche makes clear that he sees them as stemming from profound 
racial instincts. He views his own thought as a derivative, in part, 
from his blood. "My ancestors were Polish noblemen: I have many 
racial instincts from this source" (EH 7). The power of blood 
perseveres to maintain ethnic continuities for peoples over thousands 
of years. "The concept of power, whether of a god or of a man, 
always includes both the ability to help, and the ability to harm.
Thus it is with the Arabs; thus with the Hebrews. Thus with all 
strong races" (WP 193).
Nietzsche shows no compunctions about tracing cultural 
phenomena to racial roots. For instance, in The Birth of Tragedy, 
he states that "The Platonic distinction between the idea and the 
eidolon is deeply rooted in the Greek temperament." This position is 
held firmly throughout his career, and carried right into his last 
work, The Will to Power. For Nietzsche, what defined the Greeks' 
collective soul, and their culture, was their overcoming of some 
Asiatic racial instincts that might have rendered their culture 
inferior. "The immoderate, disorderly Asiatic lies at his (the 
Greek's) roots: the bravery of the Greek consists in his struggle 
with his Asiaticism; beauty is not given to him, as little as is logic or 
the naturalness of customs—it is conquered, willed, won by struggle— 
it is his victory" (WP 540).
These same principles are also applied to the Germans. 
Nietzsche does not attribute German cultural weakness to the impact 
of the Reformation, the Thirty Years' War, or any other event. He 
goes right to the root, to an innate Germanic lack of esprit. For 
example, "It seems that their Catholicism is much more an intrinsic 
part of the Latin races than the whole of Christianity in general is of 
us northerners . . . We northerners are undoubtedly descended from 
barbarian races also in respect of our talent for religion: we have 
little talent for it" (BGE 77). If this were not a racial stereotype,
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why not just say "an intrinsic part of Latin culture"? The idea is that 
talent, among peoples, either exists at a racial level or it does not. 
"There are also peoples that are failures" (WP 467): Hence, the 
accentuated importance of breeding as the only way to transcend 
biological shortcomings. While Nietzsche's insistence that the 
Germans are innately flawed at the biological level might seem to 
contradict the Nazi insistence on German racial superiority, this falls 
in line with Nietzsche's urge to end German nationalism as a craven 
stupidity, the issue is a double-edged sword. For at the same time, 
Nietzsche gives credence to a biological determinism and/or an 
enhanced value to the concept of breeding. He also expands the 
possibility that certain peoples might be innately flawed to an 
irredeemable degree, depending on one's criteria.
As one might expect, Nietzsche's meditations on race, even his 
stereotypes, were not intended for debates about racial hierarchies. 
Nietzsche's racial stereotypes contribute to his portrait of the 
importance of "racial instincts," and a belief that "the mixed race 
man . . .will, on average, be a rather weak man" (BGE 121). In the 
discrete breeding of Europe's aristocracy, he observed an 
indispensable ingredient for culture. The purpose over his attention 
to race was not to conjure up racial animus, but to draw attention to 
natural instincts, and the need to nurture them. Still, when reading 
his works, one must constantly bear in mind: what political ideology, 
if not the Nazis', maintained convictions about the "natural order" 
similar to these?
Skepticism arises . . . whenever races or classes long 
separated from one another are decisively and suddenly 
crossed. In the new generation, which has as it were 
inherited varying standards and values in its blood, all is 
unrest, disorder, doubt, experiment; the most vital 
forces have a retarding effect, the virtues themselves 
will not let one another grow and become strong, 
equilibrium, center of balance, upright certainty are 
lacking in body and soul. But that which becomes most 
profoundly sick and degenerates in such hybrids is the 
will: they no longer have any conception of 
independence of decision. . . Our Europe of today, the
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scene of a senselessly sudden attempt at radical class - 
and consequently race - mixture, is as a result skeptical 
from top to bottom . . .like a cloud overcharged with 
question marks (BGE 136-137).
Hence, the preservation of racial purity is valued by Nietzsche as a 
natural instinct, which, like all instincts, should be adhered to. The 
Europeans' failure to cultivate this instinct is another example of 
their decay. "It lies in the instinct of a community (family, race, 
herd, tribe) to feel that the conditions and desires to which it owes its 
survival are valuable in themselves" (WP 127).
Clearly, Nietzsche viewed all instincts as evolutionary tools for 
survival, and the racial instinct stood among these. To him, strong 
races such as the Jews have historically remained strong by 
spiritualizing the ethic of not marrying outside of race. Nietzsche 
repeatedly refers to the "strong, intelligent, and vigorous races" (WP 
85) throughout his writings, partially with reference to their 
ostensible purity. Similarly, inattention to breeding results in a 
chaos of will, spirit, and mind, which leads to exhaustion and 
inevitable decadence. "The race is corrupted—not by its vices but by 
its ignorance; it is corrupted because it did not recognize exhaustion 
as exhaustion: mistakes about physiological states are the source of 
all ills" (WP 34). Interestingly, Nietzsche sees a reciprocal 
relationship between race-mixing and decadence. Races will not 
relinquish their instincts to purity before becoming sick, and sickness 
in turn makes races more susceptible to relinquishing their instincts. 
"One understands nothing of the psychology of Christianity if one 
takes it to be the expression of a newly arisen national youthfulness 
and racial invigoration. On the contrary: it is a typical form of 
decadence, the moral hypersensitivity and hysteria of a sick 
mishmash populace grown weary and aimless" (WP 109).
Nietzsche knew that the individual's capitulation to instinct is 
not always good. A large potential for barbarous license existed in 
primitive Dionysianism. Yet cultures that do not adhere to instinct, 
particularly the master instincts, in religion, myth, custom, law, and 
everyday society, either begin as slave cultures or end up as them.
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Therein lies the necessity of the Apollonian; the compulsion to keep 
certain fundamental cultural foundations, such as race, relatively 
static. For a master culture to choose change inevitably means that it 
has chosen a slavish way of life. One either ascends or descends.
And for Nietzsche, as shown, the capitulation of a master race to 
race-mixing inevitably results in spiritual chaos, and descension.
The Nazis pilfered these ideas; they did not need to "misuse" 
them. And while the Nazis did look past Nietzsche's diatribes against 
the Germans, they had little choice. Were the Nazis to heed the 
intellectual wisdom about the German people as conferred by 
Nietzsche, they would have been forced to accept passively the 
Germans' role as a culturally bankrupt people, virtually incapable or 
overcoming a crippling Versailles Treaty. Everything else that 
Nietzsche had said spurred them to act. The Nazis may have been 
evil, but they were motivated by the same goals and revulsions as 
Nietzsche. Their task was to awaken the Christian, democratic, 
European herd-animal and remind him that in his soul of souls, he 
was still a predator. The Nazis only had to reiterate to Germany's 
veterans what they had learned in The Will to Power, a German's 
second Bible in the trenches of World War I.
Overall view of the future European: the most intelligent 
slave animals, very industrious, . . . multifarious, 
pampered, weak of will—a cosmopolitan chaos of affects 
and intelligence. How could a stronger species raise itself 
out of him? A species with classical taste? This means 
strengthening, to visible happiness, to the terrible, the 
courage of psychological nakedness . . .  To fight upward 
out of that chaos to this form—requires a compulsion: one 
must be faced with the choice of perishing or prevailing.
A dominating race can grow up only out of terrible and 
violent beginnings. Problem: where are the barbarians of 
the twentieth century? Obviously they will come into view 
and consolidate themselves only after tremendous socialist 
crises—they will be the element capable of the greatest 
severity toward themselves and able to guarantee the most 
enduring will (WP 464-465).
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Such words gave substance and form to the Nazi political anomaly. 
While the Great War had made most of Europe war-weary, the 
Nazis saw that a great war had not yet been fought for a higher 
purpose. No one could say why Europe had bludgeoned itself 
between 1914 and 1918. Europe had not been resurrected in a 
Nietzschean sense, she had only slipped further into her malaise.
The Weimar Republic had not transcended the cultural decay of 
Western Civilization. Increased democracy and inclusiveness, and 
the greater will to pacifism had only redefined decadence in the 
Nietzschean sense.
The Nazis' desire to redefine Western values resulted in the 
Western redefinition of evil to encompass all things "Nazi." Yet for 
Nietzsche and the Nazis, that which is "evil" is not necessarily 
destructive, "The strongest and most evil spirits have so far done the 
most to advance humanity" (GSC 79). So-called "bad" emotions, 
such as "hatred, envy, covetousness, and lust for domination" are 
actually the "most fundamental and essential in the total economy of 
life" (BGE 53). "Everything good is the evil of former days made 
serviceable," (WP 530) and "history contains the gruesome fact that 
the exhausted have always been mistaken for the fullest—and the 
fullest for the most harmful" (WP 30). With Nietzsche, war, 
slavery, aristocracy, paganism, heartlessness, and hardness are 
preferable to peace, egalitarianism, democracy, Christianity, pity, 
and comfort. That which is perceived to be evil in the modern 
world is actually noble and good, that which is perceived to be good 
is actually ignoble and bad. The values of the modern world are 
exactly wrong. The Nazis' reputation as the antithesis of what is 
good in our world undeniably gives them common cause with 
Nietzsche, if only by default.
As might be expected, the Nazis conceived of each and every 
ethnic group as having a "soul" of its own. These ethnic souls 
expressed their unique features through their cultural anomalies. In 
the words of Nietzsche scholar Mark Warren, "Nietzsche's political, 
economic, and biological assumptions caused him to reduce all 
modem political and economic causes of nihilism to cultural and
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biological ones."9 The Nazis were no different. Scholars often 
search for the roots of cultural practices, and find at these roots, 
other cultural practices. Every cultural, and ultimately political 
issue can be traced to a root stemming from race and racial instinct. 
Both Nietzsche and the Nazis found that if one searches long enough, 
cultural explanations cannot beget cultural explanations.
Rosenberg often quoted Paul de Lagarde, one of the subjects 
of Fritz Stern's The Politics o f Cultural Despair. Both shared the 
idea that "peoples are the thoughts of God.”10 For example, 
Rosenberg also believed that "African primitivism crept into central 
Europe from the south, promoted by 'niggerized Americanism' and 
French 'power politics." The second pincer against Europe was 
supposedly formed by "Mongolian waves of bolshevism," besieging 
Germany from the east, and threatening the "extermination of all 
German cultural values."11 Nietzsche hated the incessant ramblers 
of race, and he did not feel that the Germans shared values worthy of 
defending. Still, Nazis like Rosenberg shared a unique point of view 
with Nietzsche: Cultural issues ultimately stem from biological roots.
The same could be said of the following observation made by 
Nazi theorist R.W. Darre.
In Germany until well into the nineteenth century, not 
only the nobility, but also groups of craftsmen and 
Germanic peasants very consciously pursued a policy of 
selective breeding. It is surprising to discover in the old 
traditions the extent to which German marriage laws 
were filled with wisdom about the interdependence of 
blood and culture, especially in those cases where the 
Germans intentionally erected a blood barrier, as for 
example toward the Slavs. Today our people seem to 
have lost all this wisdom.1?
9Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 187.
10Alfred Rosenberg, The Memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg. 114.
1 iAlan E. Steinweis, "Weimar Culture and the Rise of National Socialism: The 
Kampfbund fur deutsche Kultur," Central European History 24, no.4 (1991): 409.
12R.W. Darre, from Edward Dimondberg, Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, The Weimar 
Source Book. 234.
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This quotation indicates the Nazi race mania. Also unlike the Nazis, 
Nietzsche said remarkably little, either positive or negative, about 
the Slavs. Still, he would have recognized Darre's "wisdom," and 
the historical significance of these ancient Germanic taboos. 
Similarities and dissimilarities could be listed ad nauseum. The point 
is that a vein of similarity in thought between Nietzsche and the 
Nazis is obvious. In spite of a half-century of downplaying the 
similarities between these ideologies, who besides Nietzsche and the 
radical right-wing ever accept race as anything but a hindrance to 
progress?
Nietzsche and the Nazis also shared a somewhat similar vision 
about who would constitute the future master race. One should not 
confuse the Nazi rhetoric about German superiority with the 
assumption that "the Germans" meant only greater Germany per se. 
The Nazis' racial vision incorporated all Germanic peoples, 
including the predominantly Frankish French, and the Anglo-Saxon 
British. The SS, despite its wildly idealistic picture of the ideal 
racial prototype, did not give special consideration in its recruitment 
to Germans over Norwegians, Swedes, Danes, N etherlander, or the 
rest. In fact, SS recruitment posters in Scandinavia purposefully 
likened the new steely-eyed SS man with the savage blond-beast of 
Viking times. However Romantic such a likening may have been, 
Nietzsche preferred such nostalgia to the Western alternative of 
perpetual effeminacy. "'A hard heart has Wotan set in my breast,' it 
says in an old Scandinavian saga: a just expression coming from the 
soul of a proud Viking" (BGE 196). The SS was designed to be 
more than an elite corps of secret police, key to the preservation of 
the authoritarian regime. They were supposed to reflect the cream 
of the racial stock of Germanic Europe and the forefathers of 
Europe's future master race. As Germanic blood had scattered 
across Europe for millenia, Europe's new aristocracy was to have a 
pan-European origin.
Nietzsche appreciated such images. In fact, the SS officer 
came closer to Nietzsche's ideal type for the re-foundation of Europe 
than he might have dreamed possible so soon after his own time. In 
the foundation of his totally "New Order," "Himmler, through
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Auslese (selection) and Zucht (breeding) wanted to cultivate a new 
human type - a loyal, duty-committed, tough, and self-sacrificing 
warrior-leader, scholar, and administrator all in one, who was 
capable of coping with the enormous task that lay ahead."13 It must 
also be noted that the racial fanaticism that accompanied the 
formation of the SS in theory did not materialize in fact. In spite of 
his rhetoric, Hitler was nowhere near as fanatical about the racial 
specifications of the SS as was Himmler,14 and the aesthetic 
specifications of the elite unit were softened as mandated by the 
necessities of the war.
In other words, in spite of the cruelty and stupidity displayed 
by the SS in its treatment of Slavs and Jews before and during the 
war, the SS served a higher function than traditional images of them 
would suggest. The SS did not materialize as a country-club for six- 
foot blue-eyed blondes. It represented the Nazis' core hope for a 
new kind of man, based in large part on the.same extreme 
specifications articulated by Nietzsche himself. The modern 
conception of the SS is not that it was a stupid organization, but a 
dangerous one founded on the profoundest evil. Nietzsche imagined 
that his new European man would fight with bravery, rule with 
discipline, obey with loyalty, and above all, exploit with great eviL
The European Man
A comparison between Nietzsche's and the Nazis' use of race 
and hierarchy yields many similarities, but some important 
differences as well. Nietzsche clearly believed in the existence of 
racial instincts as sublime intuitions that characterized ethnic groups 
and helped to explain the anomalies of each respective culture. The 
mixing of these instincts in Europe, both between nations and 
between classes (which for millennia had bred relatively discretely), 
had led to a spiritual chaos and contributed to Europe's cultural 
decline.
13Herbert F. Ziegler, Nazi Germany's New Aristocracy: The SS Leadership 1925- 
1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 52.
14Robert E. Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 78.
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The historical sense has come to us in the wake of the 
mad and fascinating semi-barbarism into which Europe 
has been plunged through the democratic mingling of 
classes and races. . . The past of every form and mode 
of life, of cultures that formerly lay close beside or on 
top of one another, streams into us 'modem souls' 
thanks to this mingling, our instincts now run back in all 
directions, we ourselves are a kind of chaos (BGE 152- 
153).
And yet, "the spirit perceives its advantage in all this" (BGE 
153). Nietzsche saw in Europe's decline the very seeds of its rebirth. 
The very mingling of Europe's classes and races will contribute to its 
renewal, but patently not in a leftist, universalist sense in which 
racial mingling will contribute to a hybrid human prototype, and a 
united world free of racial or class struggle. For Nietzsche, racial 
mingling in Europe had gone too far already. The only way to 
correct the damage done would be to finish the job and create a new, 
homogenized European prototype. This man will not be content to 
take an equal place among the other nations of the world. This new 
European will be outfitted for the domination of the world.
The homogenizing of European man is the great process 
that cannot be obstructed: one should even hasten it.
The necessity to create a gulf, distance, order of rank, is 
given. . .  As soon as it is established, this homogenizing 
species requires a  justification: it lies in serving a 
higher sovereign species that stands upon the former and 
can raise itself to its task only by doing this. Not merely 
a master race whose sole task is to rule, but a race with 
its own sphere of life, with an excess of strength for 
beauty, bravery, culture, manners to the highest peak of 
the spirit; an affirming race that may grant itself every 
great luxury . . . beyond good and evil (WP 478).
Unquestionably, Nietzsche's hope for a race of Ubermenschen was 
not rooted in a vision of a collective selection of the best humanity 
had to offer, but restricted itself to a vision of the future European 
man.,
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The Nazis, of course, wanted to limit this homogenization to 
the Germanic type. For them, the Slavs were nothing but slaves. As 
a fanatical racial purist, Himmler, for example, wished specifically 
to avoid the amalgamation of all Europe's races. That very concept 
mandated the incorporation of Jews, Slavs, and Mediterranean types 
into the greater Germanic fold. All of the racial ideology of the 
Third Reich was designed specifically to avoid this. Himmler was 
too doctrinaire in his pursuit of the ideal. Nordic prototype even to 
fill his own quotas for the SS before the war began.
I insist on a height of 1.70 meters. I personally select a 
hundred or two a year and insist on photographs which 
reveal if there are any Slav or Mongolian 
characteristics. I particularly want to avoid such types 
as the members of the 'Soldier' Councils' of 1918-1919, 
people who looked somewhat comic in our German eyes 
and often gave the impression of being foreigners.15
The Nazi Marriage Order of 1931 completed the Nazi eugenic 
agenda.16 All prospective brides of SS officers were required to 
pass the same test of Aryan ancestral purity as were their husbands. 
As the war approached, Himmler relaxed all of his ideological 
convictions (excepting his intensified hatred of the Jews). In spite of 
the Holocaust, the Nazi eugenic ideals for a pure Germanic 
population were given increasingly less priority as the war escalated. 
The practical necessities of war triumphed over the ethereal realm of 
ideas. Nietzsche concerned himself far less with real human 
behavior than with his own visions for the future of human 
existence. The ideal of homogenizing Europe's population epitomizes 
Nietzsche's often grandiose meditations. In contrast, the Nazis still 
adhered to the late nineteenth-century conventional wisdom of 
cultural healing through national purification.
In fact, the Nazi view that the West could be saved only by the 
toil of Germanic blood bears an imitative resemblance to the eugenic
15Ibid., 79.
16Herbert F. Ziegler, Nazi Germany's New Aristocracy. 58.
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theories of late nineteenth century Europe. Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain, for example, advised "abandoning these formulae 
which have but served to give rise to endless errors, we are left with 
the simple and clear view that our whole civilization and culture of 
today is the work of one definite race of men—the Teutonic."17 Such 
hyperbole highlights the very source of Nietzsche's castigation of 
nationalism. Ideas of innate racial superiority paralyze the 
individual into believing that all of their actions or inactions are 
justified merely by the blood flowing through their veins.
These alternative conceptions of the future composite 
Europeans mark an important distinction between the thought of 
Nietzsche and that of the Nazis. The distinction is an obvious one. 
This part of the essay directs itself at the hidden connections between 
the ideologies of Nietzsche and the Nazis in spite o f  their obvious 
differences. The idea that race has a role to play, any role, is an 
avenue of thought down which very few in the modem world have 
been willing to travel very far. For all concerned, a regenerated 
Europe was in order, complete with a new aristocracy, a pitiless 
warrior class, the destruction of Christian and French Revolutionary 
values, and a redefinition of community. For all these, the breeding 
of a new European was literally required. One could easily focus on 
their differing conceptions of the "New European." The similarities 
in Nietzsche's and the Nazis' conceptions of Europe's "new man" are 
subtle, and could easily be overlooked. These similarities are also 
manifold, and are appreciated by few other philosophical or political 
thinkers.
In 1915, when many held Nietzsche's ideas to be a key catalyst 
for the war, Herbert Leslie Stewart said in Nietzsche and the Ideals 
of Modern Germany, "His view of heredity is of the very essence of 
his thought."18 The advent of National Socialism did not hasten this 
reading of Nietzsche. Nietzsche had earned a racist reputation long 
before Hitler became known. The element of pre-Socratic Greece 
most admired by Nietzsche, of course, was its aristocracy. He firmly
17Joachim Remak, The Nazi Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969), 1.
18Herbert Leslie Stewart. Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modem Germany
(London: Edward Arnold, 1915), 120.
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believed that the aristocratic conception of heredity, sexuality, and 
beauty facilitated the ancient Greek production and reproduction of a 
higher type. Nietzsche believed in the timeless realities of the human 
condition, not in "progress." The instinctual drives represent the 
cardinal realities of the human condition. People's adherence to 
instinct cannot help but yield them more fulfilling cultures.
•No substitute for this maxim should dictate the human 
condition. Thus, progress as an idea only hinders adherence to 
instinctual life by positing the misguided notion that human nature 
changes and improves over time. "Mankind does not represent a 
development toward something better or stronger or higher in the 
sense accepted today. 'Progress' is merely a modern idea, that is, a 
false idea" (ATC 571). This idea can only end in humanity's 
forgetting what it means to be human, that is: forgetting what it 
once meant to be human. We must therefore take our cues from the 
most vibrant cultures that have ever existed. Man does not "evolve" 
out of a condition of hierarchy, militarism, chauvinism, slave- 
ownership, and myth if such a condition maintained the greatest 
cultures the world has ever known. Changing such a condition only 
means aiming toward decadence. At such points in Nietzsche's 
writings, he evidently epitomizes the true antithesis of Marx. "The 
labor question. The stupidity—at bottom, the degeneration of 
instinct, which is today the cause of all stupidities—is that there is a 
labor question at all. Certain things one does not question: that is 
the first imperative of instinct" (TWI 545). Few would agree with 
Nietzsche's certainty that progress does not exist. Aside from the 
self-proclaimed extreme right and Nietzsche, hardly anyone in the 
past two centuries has argued against progress.
Hegel perfected the Christian-universal philosophy by showing 
that the dialectical procession inevitably leads to a union of man and 
God. Using the Hegelian dialectic in a secular form, Marx portrayed 
history as the unstoppable, progressive march of the worker toward 
a universal utopia. Liberalism has taken great stock in the 
technological innovations that we all witness, and in the spirit of 
optimism of the Enlightenment. Even modem conservatives have 
brandished the idea of progress as a weapon in their ideological
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combat. They only espouse a more controlled, guided, organic form 
of progress than do liberals. Social Democrats and other moderate 
leftists have pointed to the proliferation of rights for all as evidence 
that we all have more, and are closer to being equal than ever, and 
that all is therefore getting better. Almost any politically-minded 
person of the past two centuries has placed his or her faith in human 
reason and in our collective ability to identify and solve historic 
"problems." As we move further from myth, superstition, and 
ignorance, we "progress."
Excepting Nietzsche and the radical right, few intellectual 
camps have failed to coin a new brand of progress during the last 
century. For Nietzsche, the pathos of progress stands as but another 
signpost of Western decadence. It underscores another instance 
where modern Western man has gotten things exactly wrong. "Faith 
in 'progress'—in the lower spheres of intelligence appears as 
ascending life; but this is self-deception; in the higher spheres of 
intelligence as descending life" (WP 70). Few stop to consider that 
the whole idea of progress necessitates a destination. One would not 
get on a highway and claim to be progressing unless he or she knew 
their destination and was headed toward it. For Nietzsche, in this 
sense, the source of the dilemma in the West is that mankind has no 
goal. Progress in the West has taken one of two forms. Often, 
dogmatic adherence to progress as an idea necessitates absolutely no 
thought about its meaning. Far more often, a vague notion of a post- 
hierarchical culture, in which no one has more than anyone else, 
either in a Christian, Marxist, or liberal sense, is blindly followed. 
Nietzsche not only finds such visions patently repulsive, he offers an 
alternative vision in which progress would at least mean the reverse 
of regression.
It is clear, what I combat is economic optimism: as if 
increasing expenditure of everybody must necessarily 
involve the increasing welfare of everybody. The 
opposite seems to me to be the case: expenditure on 
everybody amounts to a collective loss: man is 
diminished—so one no longer knows what aim this
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tremendous process has served. An aim? a new aim?— 
that is what humanity needs (WP 464).
For Nietzsche, those facilitating the progressive ideas of the present 
spur man either to an undesirable end, or to no end at all. As 
Nietzsche scorns the values of modern man, he posits a goal 
antithetical to universal equality. Throughout his writings, he lends 
support to a slave-owning warrior-aristocracy which seeks not to 
avoid the exploitation of others, but to make such exploitation the 
foundation of a new culture. The "new aim" of the new man
needs the opposition of the masses, of the "leveled," a 
feeling of distance from them! he stands on them, he 
lives off them. This higher form of aristocracy is that 
of the future.— Morally speaking, this overall 
machinery, this solidarity of all gears, represents a 
maximum in the exploitation of man; but it presupposes 
those on whose account this exploitation has meaning 
(WP 464).
Why Nietzsche rejects the idea of progress should be clear.
Yet it total opposition to modem standards, Nietzsche unabashedly 
asserted that a culture of slavery, no matter how decadent, must be 
superior to liberal-democratic capitalism. Like the Nazis, he made 
huge allowances for any kind of assault upon modem egalitarianism. 
"Abolition of slavery'—supposedly a tribute to 'human dignity,' is in 
fact a destruction of a fundamentally higher type" (WP 174). 
Nietzsche's concern with the quality of human existence falls short of 
a concern for the quality of all humans' existences. Nietzsche 
accepted that the pitiless exploitation of some human minions for 
menial labor allows others freedom to live more noble lives. Saying 
that all can live nobly is tantamount to saying that all should live as 
slaves. For the fullest existences and the higher types to thrive, 
societal stratification is indispensable. "One should defend virtue 
against the preachers of virtue: they are its worst enemies. For they 
teach virtue as an ideal for everyone; they take from virtue the 
charm of rareness, inimitableness, exceceptionalness, and
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unaverageness—its aristocratic magic" (WP 175). Nietzsche felt that 
any cultural development evolving in this direction could not be 
interpreted as positive. All non-exclusive cultural milieus produce a 
fictitious image of freedom. "The whole o f  the West no longer 
possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a 
future grows: perhaps nothing antagonizes its 'modem spirit' so 
much. One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very 
irresponsibly: precisely because this is called freedom" (ATC 543).
The most vital reason for Nietzsche's crusade against 
democracy was that he truly felt democracy to be a destructive, not a 
creative force. Not only does democracy make war against 
everything rare and noble, it also poisons the soil on which noble 
characters can grown. "Today when the herd animal alone obtains 
and bestows honors in Europe, when 'equality of rights' could all too 
easily change into equality in wrongdoing: I mean into a general 
war on everything rare, strange, privileged, the higher man, the 
higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, creative 
fullness of power and mastery . . .  To ask it again: is greatness 
possible today?" (BGE 144) Therein, Nietzsche reveals the 
temptation to act against modernity. For all his predictions that 
millennia would be required before an emergence from the Western 
malaise might occur, Nietzsche presents the possibility that if 
something is not done soon, all hope for a rebirth of culture might 
disappear forever.
The Nazi experiment does not provide the perfect realization 
of Nietzsche's demand for a new aristocracy. After all, the Nazis 
promised at some future date to extinguish the remains of Germany's 
ancient noble privilege. The contradiction between Nietzschean 
aristocracy and the socialism of the Nazis has been shown. But 
again, in every perceived difference between the two, fundamental 
likenesses appear in more subtle forms. The exclusivist component 
of National Socialism certainly merits a comparison with Nietzsche's 
advocacy of hierarchy.
In spite of Hitler's socialism, his conception of hierarchy 
compares with Nietzsche's ideal of cultures composed of poleis. On 
a world scale instead of on a small scale like Greece, aristocratically
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inclined nations (particularly the Germanic) would govern their own 
areas, and those immediately surrounding them. In the midst of the 
world's noble nations would be excluded classes of slaves who were 
forbidden to breed with, or make war like the dominant ethnic group 
around them. In this sense, though, Hitler's Weltanschauung did not 
necessarily limit him to the Germanic type. He accepted a similar 
form of dominance for the Japanese throughout Asia. Still, Hitler 
drew his inspiration from the white conquest of the western United 
States, and from the colonial projects of the British around the 
world. He viewed the British as a sort of Athens to outpost other 
parts of the world, across the horizon from his Sparta. "I am 
prepared to approach England once more with a large and 
comprehensive offer . . .  I am a man of great decisions and in this 
case also I shall be capable of a great action. I accept the British 
Empire and I am ready to pledge myself personally to its continued 
existence and to commit the power of the German Reich to this.''19
However Nietzsche's and Hitler's criteria may have differed 
for discerning precisely who should dominate, their principle of 
domination based at least partly on ethnic grounds remains a 
common theme. Hitler saw little to choose between the British 
domination of Africans in reality and the German domination of the 
Slavs in theory. The British had always justified their presence in 
Africa on the grounds that the "inferior" races could not govern 
themselves, and the British had colonized in such a way that the 
Africans had become virtual slave laborers on their own continent. 
The Nazi plans for the Slavs differed little. The British may not 
have recognized their own hypocrisy when reading Mein Kampf, 
they were largely horrified at Hitler's plans for Lebensraum. But 
ideologically, Hitler counted on the British as his allies. They had 
proven to him, through their own colonial policies, that they 
maintained the Germanic instinct for pitiless, aristocratic dominance. 
In fact, Britain's elitist colonial policies were not abandoned until 
after World War II. Hitler saw no reason why the British should 
deny him the status of ally. "For such a policy, there is only one
19Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 617.
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single ally in Europe: England. With England alone, one's back 
being covered, could one begin the new Germanic invasion. Our 
right to do this would not have been less than that of our forefathers. 
None of our pacifists refuses to eat the bread of the East, although 
the first plow was once called 'sword'!"20
In addition to the prospects for an aristocratic order along the 
lines of Athens and Sparta, the Nazi plan for settlement in the east 
depended on pseudo-feudal social strata based on ethnicity. The Nazi 
plan for enslaving the conquered Slavs, and repopulating their land 
with Germans is well-known, and shall be covered only briefly here. 
One interesting anecdote to denote the tenor of the Nazi ideology, 
however, is Himmler's plan to reinvent the SS along lines strikingly 
similar to the ancient Order of the Teutonic Knights. "Himmler 
never restricted himself to Russia, but (hoped to) cultivate every 
possible colonial area. Furthermore, the pet scheme of a new 
Ordensland for the SS, what east Prussia had been for the Teutonic 
Knights, impelled Himmler to seek settlement territory not 
contiguous to Germany. Here he could develop his SS strongpoints 
and his Wehrbauem (peasant militia)."21
Following a Nazi victory, social stratification in Germany 
proper would increasingly decline due to the Nazi socialist program.
1 Yet in the east, a system of feudal aristocracy would appear even 
more inegalitarian than anything from the Middle Ages. Himmler's 
SS would form the core of a Germanic ethnic community in a 
remote island of the former Slavic hinterlands. They would provide 
the leadership of a bureaucratic-warrior class, like a class of 
Janissaries, and would be the nucleus of a breeding stock to usher in . 
the age of the Ubermenschen. The SS would be supported by a 
second sphere of Germanic ethnicity in the form of former soldiers, 
promised land after the conquest of Lebensraum. They would form 
the rank-and-file of a peasant militia to guard the conquered lands 
against the surrounding Slavs.22 In the lowest caste, the Slavs would
20Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf.183.
2 Robert E. Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 254.
2 2 Ibid.
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remain in the countryside for whatever menial purpose their 
Germanic masters set for them.
This picture begs an interesting question. When comparing 
the ideas of Nietzsche and the Nazis concerning the issue of 
aristocratic versus mass culture, should one focus on socialism in 
Germany, or the hope for feudal serfdom in the newly conquered 
eastern territories?
If one pictures Himmler's Lebensraum as the model of 
Germanic sociological ideology, comparisons with Nietzsche 
substantially suffer. The enslavement of the Slavs along strict ethnic 
lines, the insistence that the Germans play the role of the Master 
Race, and the attempt even to forge the Master Race from the shoddy 
ideological materials of the modem age would all have either given 
Nietzsche pause, or made him laugh out loud. Still, Nietzsche could 
not have objected to the seeming injustice of such a situation. The 
Nazi colonization of the east was a wildly anachronistic idea, and 
completely lacking in justification during an increasingly egalitarian 
age. The Nazi conception of Lebensraum fits the modern definition 
of evil. And as Nietzsche would say, "From a superior v iew point. .
. one desires the ever-increasing dominion of evil, the growing 
emancipation of man from the narrow and fear-ridden bonds of 
morality, the increase of force, in order to press the mightiest 
natural power—the affects—into service" (WP 208). And, "the evil 
god is needed no less than the good god: after all, we do not owe 
our own existence to tolerance and humanitarianism" (ATC 583).
For Nietzsche, even the most crass experiments are at least as 
justified as the perseverance of universalism in all its forms.
The Correlation of the Christian and Marxist Utopias
Correlations are often made between Marxist-Leninism and 
Nazi-Fascism. Both espouse totalitarian forms of government to 
control the population. Both rely on mass-movements to attain and 
secure power. The extreme left and the extreme right have 
traditionally put a higher value on order and adherence to 
ideological convictions than on creativity. Both have taken part in 
the greatest genocides in history. These issues reflect similar tactics
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for the maintenance of control. Yet neither the Marxists nor the 
Nazis believe in totalitarianism as a goal, a hope, and a dream. Total 
authority represents only the means to an end. The ends sought by 
each could not be much different than they are.
In the words of Steven Aschheim, "Nietzsche was harnessed to 
the struggle against Marxism and bolshevism, which Nietzsche 
regarded as his greatest future opponent, the very embodiment of 
nihilism."23 It is often forgotten that Communists have traditionally 
viewed their ideology as the ultimate consummation of democratic 
values. Communist East Germany, for example, was called the 
German Democratic Republic. Ideally in Communism (though never 
in practice), everyone in society is equal, and therefore has an equal 
voice in government. Nietzsche shared the view that Communism 
logically succeeded democracy. He disagreed with Hegel's dialectic 
and believed that history had no destination. Marx represented to 
Nietzsche an intensified absurdity of dialectical theory, having 
simply added the poisons of materialism and nihilism. Says Nolte, 
"What Nietzsche hated most in Marxism was not its proletarian but 
its bourgeois nature."24 Nietzsche followed dialectical theory to the 
extent that he recognized the transition from Christianity to the 
Enlightenment, and from democracy to communism as a logical 
progression. And while he seldom if ever mentions Marx directly, 
his systemic crusade against "socialist blockheads" leaves little doubt 
about his main target. Nietzsche saw no necessary end result to 
history, and he viewed all of the above value systems as stemming 
from originally misguided principles. Nietzsche recognized a causal, 
historical chain in history in the Marxist-Hegelian sense. He simply 
refused to view this chain as evidence of any pre-ordained outcome.
In opposition to the universal, dialectical, progressive visions 
of the leftist Marx and the Christian Hegel, Nietzsche's Genealogy of  
Morals "shows us a noble past, a triumphant slave revolt in morality, 
and a confused, directionless present."25 With Hegel and Marx (as
23Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany. 238.
24Emst Nolte. Three Faces of Fascism. 314.
25Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker.
154.
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examples), if history has a goal, then the dialectical points of 
synthesis along the path toward that goal are good and necessary. As 
soon as the goal is taken from the equation, as Nietzsche does, then 
the stopping points on the dialectic, like the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism to utopia, or from Christianity to 
Enlightenment to democracy to utopia, also lose their meaning. In 
this way, Nietzsche adds fire to his assault on many of the Western 
values forged from Socrates to Christ and beyond.
From these ideological grounds, Nietzsche launches his assault 
on Christianity, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and 
socialism or communism. Said Nietzsche, "I abhor Christianity with 
a deadly hatred, because it created sublime words and gestures to 
throw over a horrible reality the cloak of justice, virtue, and 
divinity" (WP 364). In other words, Christianity represents a grand 
systematization of ideological uncleanliness and pretense. It might be 
called the first brand of political correctness, "the most fatal, 
seductive lie that has yet existed" (WP 117). Nietzsche pinpoints the 
early equation between the decadence of Socratic logo-centrism, and 
Christianity. Both represent an assault on life. "Christianity only 
takes up the fight that had already begun against the classical ideal 
and the noble religion" (WP 115). Into the vacuum of ancient Greek 
culture swept Christianity, masquerading as life where life once had 
reigned. "What astonishes one about the religiosity of the ancient 
Greeks is the tremendous amount of gratitude that emanates from it - 
the kind of man who stands thus before nature and before life is a 
very noble one! - Later, when the rabble came to predominate in 
Greece, fear also overran religion; and Christianity was preparing 
itself" (BGE 78). Marxism represents the latest and most insidious 
strain of the corrosive virus against the instinctive, hierarchical, 
pitiless impulses that had once defined ancient Greek culture.
For Nietzsche, nobility survived during the Middle Ages in 
spite o f  Christianity. Feudalism carried on the spirit of pre- 
Christian barbarism and lust for life more than it represented any 
component of Christian ideology. "The Christian faith is from the 
beginning sacrifice: sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self- 
confidence of the spirit, at the same time enslavement and self­
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mockery, self-mutilation" (BGE 75). It represents spirituality as a 
revolt against the natural instinct to outdo one's neighbor. The tenor 
of Christianity seeks not to elevate the ferocious, competitive, 
hungry spirit of all, and to raise the standard of the greatest human 
existence. Rather, it brings everyone down to the same level of the 
lowest and least instinctive natures. "Christianity is a rebellion of 
everything that crawls on the ground against that which has height: 
the evangel of the 'lowly' makes low" (ATC 620). The renunciation 
of earthly existence leads to the culled existence of the Christian.
All Christian societies do not, per se, openly wage war against 
those who adhere to their instincts. The Middle Ages exemplify a 
time when the pre-Christian elements of culture played as evident a 
role in the culture as did Catholicism. But since with Nietzsche, all 
things are perpetually in ascendancy or decline, it follows that 
Christian ethics can only grow at the expense of the beliefs of the 
cultures into which they have crept. Christian impulses do not wish 
simply to co-exist with the norms of their host cultures.
"Christianity should not be beautified and embellished: it has waged 
deadly war against this higher type of man; it has placed all the basic 
instincts of this type under the ban; and out of these instincts it has 
distilled evil and the Evil One: the strong man as the typically 
reprehensible man, the 'reprobate" (ATC 571). Paradoxically, 
Christianity extols peaceful ethics, but fights with a deadly venom 
against all cultural traits, or traits of higher men, which do not lend 
support to universal brotherhood. Only ideas which lend support to 
the herd mentality will survive the Christian wrath. "The Christian 
type: or the perfect bigot" (WP 188). In such ways, it slowly but 
surely filled the vacuum of ancient Greek culture, and it also 
destroyed the Romans.
Christianity was the vampire of the imperium Romanum 
. . . This stealthy vermin which sneaked up to every 
single one in the night, in fog and ambiguity, and sucked 
out of each single one the seriousness for true things . . . 
this cowardly, effeminate, and saccharine pack of 
alienated 'so u ls '. . . slowly fanned the fires of chandala 
revenge . . .  the same kind of religion which, in its pre-
79
existent form, Epicurus already had waged war against: 
not paganism but 'Christianity,' by which I mean the 
corruption of souls by the concepts of guilt, punishment, 
and immortality (ATC 649).
The Nazi attack on Christianity mirrored this. While 
Christianity presented a potential rival to the societal primacy of the 
Nazis and had to be fought in the interests of perpetuating a 
totalitarian regime, the Nazis also maintained very substantial 
ideological convictions against Christianity. In the words of World 
War II scholar Robert Herzstein, "Hitler hated Christianity, viewing 
it as a reactionary, anti-racial force of Jewish origin."26 Hitler's 
concerns about Christianity did not mirror Nietzsche's same 
reservations about it. Yet the attack on the "higher man" motivated 
much of the Nazi attack on Christian ideology.
As shown in the official dossier of Reich Security Officer 
Reinhard Heydrich, the Gestapo wished to eradicate Christianity 
from Germany.27 Most of the Nazi invectives against Christianity 
are shrouded in racist rhetoric, such as in the 1920 Nazi Party 
Program which opposed the "Jewish materialist spirit."28 Yet 
attention should be given not just to the Nazis' opposition to things 
"Jewish," but also to their opposition to a perceived "materialist 
spirit." As pointed out by Bullock, "it is often forgotten that Point 
19 of the original Nazi program of 1920 demanded that 'Roman 
Law, which serves a materialistic world order, be replaced By a 
German Common Law."29 Like Nietzsche, the Nazis viewed 
Christianity as an antithetical ideological competitor, but also as the 
very embodiment of the decay of an organic spiritual order.
The Nazis' program generally focused on the future, and 
rejected things which they deemed "reactionary," including 
Christianity. Yet paradoxically, they too are often also labeled as 
reactionaries. A prime reason for this label is the antiquarian nature
26Robert E. Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 1.
27Ibid., 4.
28Ibid., 37.
29Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 215.
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of their spiritual alternatives to Christianity. The Nazis had no 
futuristic solution to the problem of post-Christian Germanic 
spirituality. Their best solution was to re-authenticate pre-Christian 
Germanic paganism. And "the SS more than any other formation in 
the Third Reich tried to replace traditional Christianity with a neo­
paganism, which was but an improvised adjunct to the National 
Socialist ideology in the 'spiritual sphere."30 The idea was not that 
the Christian God provided too potent a competitor in the new 
Germany. Nor was the underlying desire of the Nazis an officially 
atheistic state. In fact, Himmler said that "any human being who 
does not believe in God should be considered arrogant, 
megalomaniacal, and stupid."31
Like Nietzsche, the Nazis saw the advent of Christianity as the 
source of the inversion of values. The instinctual, mythical, and 
noble culture of the pagan Germans resulted from thousands of years 
of accumulated cultural knowledge whose ultimate source resided in 
their very blood. Unlike Nietzsche, the Nazis' obsession with blood 
shadowed over all of their ideology. Yet Nietzsche accepted the 
biological source of culture in principle, and took for granted the 
existence of a "Germanic soul" and its evident manifestations in pre- 
Christian culture.
The development of the Jewish priestly state is not 
original; they learned the pattern in Babylon: the 
pattern is Aryan. When later on, the same thing became 
. dominant in a Europe with a preponderance of 
Germanic blood, this was in accordance with the spirit 
of the ruling race: a great atavism. The Germanic 
Middle Ages aimed at a revival of the Aryan order of 
Castes (WP 92).
Unfortunately, for Nietzsche, the Christian spirit of the Middle Ages 
prevailed over the Germanic instinct for hierarchy. The Nazis 
wished to correct this error, although a concrete plan for a mystical 
reversion to the "Germanic spirit" never materialized. Either way,
30Herbert F. Ziegler, Nazi Germany's New Aristocracy. 92.
31 Ibid., 85.
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the invectives of both Nietzsche and the Nazis share a vital similarity. 
For all concerned, Christianity must be replaced as a it detracts from 
the maintenance, let alone the production, of higher types. As long 
as "evil" exists as a category of behavior, the more selfish, dominant, 
naturally-inclined master type must feel guilt for the position of 
superiority which he imposes on others. This guilt presents the 
consummate poison in any post-decadent Nietzschean society, and in 
the proposed New Order of the Nazis.
In opposition to the "medieval dogmas" of Christianity that 
continued to plague the Germanic spirit, Alfred Rosenberg in 
particular sought to demarcate which components of Christianity 
could be accepted in the Reich, and which were corrosive beyond 
redemption. Both the Lutheran and Catholic churches maintained 
too much ideological sway in Germany to permit a full-scale 
ideological assault by the Nazis. Such a move would likely have 
produced more political heat than the Nazis could have handled. 
Instead, Rosenberg distinguished between "positive" and "negative" 
Christianity as a way of assuaging the "most damaging" effects of the 
Christian spirit, while at the same time capitulating to the reality that 
Christianity could not at any time soon be eradicated from Germany.
"Positive" Christianity emanated from "the mystic doctrine of 
blood" and the distinguishing features of Germanic culture.32 The 
positive elements in Christianity might be characterized as those 
elements which the original Germanic converts likely found 
appealing and in accordance with their own cultures, such as the 
obedience of the son to the command of the father. "Negative" 
Christianity, as one might expect, interfered with the hierarchical 
organization of nations along natural lines.33 Through Christian 
universalism, racial considerations had been undermined in Europe, 
and such elements were actively propagandized against by the Nazis. 
Christian universalism had become especially dangerous in 
conjunction with the acceptance of Enlightenment ideals. Basically, 
the elements of Christianity found least desirable by the Nazis were
32Robert E. Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 45.
33Ibid.
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those which interfered with the supposed natural instincts of the 
Germans.
The Enlightenment. The French Revolution, and Democracy
Nietzsche believed that just like Christianity, "Democracy 
represents the disbelief in great human beings and an elite society: 
'Everyone is equal to everyone else.' At bottom we are one and all 
self-seeking cattle and mob" (WP 397). The connection is no 
accident. Any society which renounces hierarchy does so under the 
banner of the Christian-slave victory. Enlightenment intellectuals 
peddled their intellectual wares as alternatives to superstition, 
dogma, and ignorance. In short, they challenged the perceived 
legacy of medieval Christianity. The philosophes were supposed to 
be the alternative to Christianity. But, ironically, "enlightened" 
democracy came closer to fulfilling the Christian promise of equality 
than the Catholic church ever had. "Democratization is a more 
natural form of (Christianity), one less mendacious" (WP 126). In 
addition to finding equality in heaven and before God, an idea 
characterized by Nietzsche as "the non plus ultra of nonsense on 
earth!," (WP 468) now all were "created equal" on earth as well.
For Nietzsche, the herd has simply become more insidious; it hides 
its agenda with different names and "isms," but the compulsion to 
destroy caste and those worthy of great and evil deeds remains 
consistent. "To me, justice speaks thus: 'Men are not equal.' Nor 
shall they become equal! What would my love of the Overman be if 
I spoke otherwise" (ZAR 213).
No wonder, then, that Nietzsche holds Christianity responsible 
for the French Revolution. Many scholars have interpreted the 
French Revolution as a revolt against the remnants of medieval 
Catholic feudalism and historic dogmatic religiosity. But the 
Revolution represents for Nietzsche only the official Western break 
with God. Paradoxically, as God is no longer the guarantor of right 
and wrong, secular Western man clings ever more tightly to the 
demand that he has rights.
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Another Christian concept, no less crazy, has passed 
evermore deeply into the tissue of modernity: the 
concept of 'the equality of souls before God." This 
concept furnishes the proto-type of all theories of equal 
rights . . .  no wonder that man ended by taking it 
seriously, taking it practically!—that is to say, 
politically, democratically, socialistically, in the spirit of 
pessimism of indignation (WP 401).
In many ways, the French Revolutionaries represented to Nietzsche 
the consummate original Christians. They fought with a passion 
describable only as the "herd passion." It was their "will to equality 
that was their will to power." (WP 80) It is the only power that 
slaves know. The Revolutionaries slaughtered the aristocracy 
because the former desired what the latter had, not because they 
believed injustice. Most of all, theirs was a passion of ressentiment, 
and they wanted others to suffer as they had suffered. Theirs was an 
ethic of revenge. The Revolutionaries were the result of centuries of 
victories for the slave revolt in morals. "This instinct of revenge has 
mastered mankind in the course of millennia . . .  as far as man has 
thought, he has introduced the bacillus of revenge into things" (WP 
401).
Interestingly, critiques of the French Revolution normally 
begin with some reminder of its licentious brutality, bordering on 
genocide. Nietzsche has no problem with the violence, only with the 
importance of another landmark victory for the herd, and the decline 
of another distinguished racial type in the form of the French 
aristocracy.
The social hodgepodge, consequence of the Revolution, 
the establishment of equal rights . . .  the bearers of the 
instincts of decline including the slave instincts, the 
instincts of cowardice, cunning, and canaille in those 
orders that have long been kept down, mingle with the 
blood of all classes: two, three generations later the 
race is no longer recognizable—everything has become 
mob. From this there results a collective instinct against 
selection, against privilege of all kinds, that is so 
powerful and self-assured, hard, and cruel in its
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operation, that the privileged themselves soon succumb 
to it: whoever still wants to retain power flatters the 
mob, works with the mob, must have the mob on its side 
(WP 461).
Clearly with Nietzsche, the Revolution stands as but another signpost 
of Western cultural exhaustion.
The Nazi ideology deals more clearly with the historical 
development of egalitarianism than with perhaps any other historical 
development. Predictably, the Nazis were obsessed with the way in 
which the forces of world equality worked against racial hierarchy. 
Nietzsche shared this concern, but devoted only a small portion of 
his thought to the issue. But both Nietzsche and the Nazis took the 
unusual position that all viable Western ideologies from Christianity 
to liberalism to Marxism were but variations of a single, insipid 
ideological impulse. Not many thinkers of the last 200 years would 
gladly discard all of these systems as irredeemably disfigured 
ideological baggage. Such an extreme position begs for extreme 
cultural solutions. If all forms of egalitarianism, pacifism, 
humanitarianism, and their ideological kin are renounced, little of 
the rock upon which Western Culture has been constructed remains 
to be recognized.
Many would portray the Nazi experiment as the very 
embodiment of Revolutionary animus and terror in the twentieth 
century. The idea of the genocide of an ostensibly privileged group 
draws a comparison between the Nazis and the Jacobins, and between 
Hitler and Robespierre. In the words of Ronald Smelser, the Nazis 
embody "the double edged sword posed by Rousseau's 'General 
Will.' The Nazi regime represented, as an experiment in totalitarian 
democracy, the other edge of that sword. It was a very 'modem' 
form of tyranny."34
Ideologically, though, the Nazis could not have been more 
opposed to the purported values of the French Revolution. For the 
Nazis, the Revolution generated the dangerous fictions which have
34Ronald Smelser, "How 'Modem' were the Nazis? DAF Social Planning and the 
Modernization Question,’’ 299.
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augmented the corrosive effects of Christianity throughout 
modernity. For instance, Nietzsche and the Nazis would have agreed 
with Gobineau's naturalist summation that "there are no human 
rights, any more than there are . . . rights o f the armadillo. The idea 
of justice is itself an illusion. Nothing exists but violence."35 This 
echoes the world-view of the first right-wing ideologists such as 
Lagarde, Van Den Bruck, and Julius Langbehn who were Nietzsche's 
contemporaries. For all of these, nature as a law trumps a 
perceived, pretentious proliferation of rights in an increasingly 
effeminate culture.
Germany's militaristic, aristocratic establishment had opposed 
the leftist values of the Revolution at least since Germany unified. 
Bismarck's militarism represents an early concurrence with the Nazi 
cultural opposition to liberal-democratic values. In the words of 
Alan Bullock, even von Hindenberg, in spite of his personal distaste 
for Hitler, "agreed with much of what Hitler said: his attacks on the 
'system,' his denunciation of democratic politics and the Marxist 
parties, his call for national unity, the abolition of the peace 
settlement, and the restoration of German greatness, including 
military power."36 The German right had espoused these values for 
nearly a century, in large part as an antithesis of the values of the 
Revolution. But after fifty years of a leftward political drift in 
Germany, Hitler had to reinvent many of the same convictions that 
had been taken for granted during Bismarck's' age. "There is only 
one most sacred human right, and this right is at the same time the 
most sacred obligation, namely: to see to it that the blood is 
preserved pure, so that by the preservation of the best human 
material a possibility is given for a more noble development of these 
human beings."37
Why did the Nazis oppose the ideologies of the French 
Revolution? O f course, Nazi militarism, advocacy of hierarchy, and 
chauvinism automatically opposed the raison d'etre of the
35Ernst Nolte, three Faces of Fascism. 280.
36Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 235.
3 7Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf.606.
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Enlightenment. Also, nationalism had, during the nineteenth 
century, ceased to be the tool of groups who wished to sabotage the 
remnants of aristocratic-European privilege. National pride had 
become an exclusive, right-wing impulse that stood in the way of 
Marxist internationalism and proletarian world-unity.
Yet a less obvious rift between the values of the right and 
those of the French Revolution is exemplified in an observance 
shared by Nietzsche and the Nazis. Nietzsche noted that the French 
Revolution had promoted an environment encouraging the weakness 
of all, as an alternative to a world where some are stronger than 
others. "It substituted slow suicide [for greatness]: gradually a 
petty, poor, but durable life; gradually a quite ordinary, bourgeois, 
mediocre life, etc." (WP 145). The Nazis recognized this, and 
demanded performance of the highest level, in a competitive 
atmosphere, in every segment of society. "The so-called 
Reichsberufsweltkampf (Reich skills competition) was inaugurated 
with great fanfare in 1936; by 1939 3.5 million apprentices were 
competing in local, regional, and national, ’Olympics' which allowed 
the Nazis to set ever higher standards of performance, while at the 
same time inculcating the concept of Volksgemeinschaft."38 Hitler 
wished to perpetrate many terrible deeds, but he also wished to halt 
the march of decadence as he defined it, and as Nietzsche similarly 
defined it. This required a complete reorientation of Germans away 
from the Enlightenment values that they had become accustomed to.
The word 'propaganda' is inadequate to convey the 
revolutionary character of Hitler's objective: nothing 
less than the transformation of people's consciousness, 
corresponding to his constantly repeated belief that it 
was politics, faith, and will, not economics and material 
circumstances, that were the deciding forces in history, 
corresponding also to his own unique ability to move the 
masses.39
38Ronald Smelser, "How ’Modem’ were the Nazis?," 288.
39Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 318.
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The re-education of Germany was actively conducted along 
perceived Nietzschean lines. According to Aschheim, "Nietzschean 
illiberalism, anti-humanism, and a politicized Lebensphilosophie 
were placed at the center of the new educational philosophy."40 In 
addition to Nazi race theory, students were subject to a curriculum 
emphasizing history, German language and literature, and a marked 
increase in time devoted to sports and physical education 41 The 
Nazis provided countless venues for an individual man to 
demonstrate his superior skills, relative to others, in all walks of life. 
The 1936 Olympics in Berlin exemplify this, but provide only one 
example. The Eilenriede Motorcycle Races promoted the beauty of 
technology while providing new outlets for individual bravery and 
exceptionality.42 While the Nazis claimed that they would do much 
for the German people, they insisted that the individual must liberate 
himself from the modem world, and its softening of the heart and 
soul. The individual German must, in some capacity, show that he is 
an Ubermensch. Said Goebbels, "The German worker will be free 
(not when the Nazi system frees him), . . . but only if he frees 
himself, with his own strength, and he will do that when he can no 
longer bear the chains of slavery."43 Naturally, this is not a 
reference to Marx's interest capital slavery, but to Nietzsche's 
metaphysical and existential slavery.
The Warrior Philosophy
My "future":—a rigorous polytechnic education.
Military service; so that, on average, every man of the 
higher classes would be an officer, whatever else he 
might be (WP 418).
Keith Ansell-Pearson, a prominent Nietzsche scholar, has 
written two books: Nietzsche Contra Rousseau, and An Introduction
40Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany. 241.
41 Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. 320.
42Adelheid von Saldem, "Cultural Conflicts, Popular Mass Culture, and the 
Question of Nazi Success," 323.
43Robert E. Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 149.
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to Nietzsche as Political Thinker, in an attempt to pinpoint a political 
agenda in "the last antipolitical German." Ansell-Pearson identified 
that agenda as the following: "The aim of the politics of the 
Overman is not to unite people, but to divide them into the strong 
and the weak."44 Nietzsche gives mixed signals regarding whether 
or not this can be accomplished along racial lines [and future Nazi 
principles]. But what is certain, as articulated by Fukuyama, is that 
"Nietzsche deliberately sought to undermine belief in human 
equality, arguing that this was simply a prejudice instilled by 
Christianity . . . and ended up celebrating what amounted to a 
doctrine of cruelty."45 This fusion of caste and cruelty leads him to 
advocate a form of primitive warrior culture, again in the spirit of 
the ancient Greeks. For Nietzsche, the existences of those in a 
warrior caste transcends all others, even the being of the artist. Due 
to his great enthusiasm in this area, admirers of Nietzsche could not 
help but be tempted by a modern militarism.
Contra Marx, "Nietzsche regards the social contract of civil 
society to be a fraud: not of the strong over the weak, but of the 
weak over the strong."46 Only through the discipline of a warrior 
class could the masses be kept in their proper, submissive place, and 
then could the caste system flourish. As stated, Nietzsche saw the 
Jews, as an example, lose their warrior class and spin into a cultural 
decline. Warriors maintain cultural integrity, and embody the 
possibility of the ultimate existence. "War is the father of all good 
things, war is also the father of good prose" (GSC 145). In an age 
where peace is held up as the ultimate value, and men with 
aggressive natures are rebuffed as adolescents, Nietzsche maintains 
that "the mature man has, above all, weapons: he attacks" (WP 385). 
Mature, that is, in adherence to his instincts. In fact, in the warrior, 
all of the best instincts, even those of the artist, are combined into 
one. "Art as the redemption of the man of action--of those who not 
only see the terrifying and questionable character of existence but
44Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker. 74.
45Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. 333.
46Keith Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche Contra Rousseau. 112.
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live it, want to live it, the tragic-warlike man, the hero" (WP 452). 
For Nietzsche* civilizations value peace as a relief from the horrors 
of war. Cultures value war as a respite from an emasculating peace. 
The warrior is aggressive, roving, lusting for conquest, 
domineering, and virile. In short, a warrior is a man who still has 
his instincts. A warrior is masculine. This wisdom has been lost to 
modernity. "Just because the 'male organ' has been amputated from 
virtue, a feminine one has been brought to the voice of virtue that it 
did not have before" (WP 120).
Like Hitler, Nietzsche praised the Spartans for their culture of 
military genius and caste domination.47 His admiration for those 
who dominated without pity or compunction extended especially to 
Cesare Borgia and Napoleon. Spengler noted the tenor of 
Germany's reception of Nietzsche's Machiavellian militarism. 
"Nietzsche baptized with the name of Cesare Borgia -  in such an 
age, unless we learn to act as real history wants us to act, we will 
cease to exist as a people."48 Spengler's interpretation, that Borgian 
lust for conquest represents the very necessity of Germany's 
survival, is not a misreading. In fact, Nietzsche's militaristic 
incantations sometimes blend into an out-of-character tolerance for 
nationalism.
The maintenance of the military state is the last means of 
all of acquiring or maintaining the great tradition with 
regard to the supreme type of man, the strong type.
And all concepts that perpetuate enmity and difference 
in rank between states (e.g. nationalism, protective 
tariffs) may appear sanctioned in this light (WP 386).
Nietzsche points to the relations between Frederick the Great 
and his father to illustrate this point. Frederick Wilhelm I "knew 
that men were lacking in Germany, and he suspected, with the 
bitterest vexation, that his own son was not enough of a man." Had 
he been right, he would have been justified in his brutal treatment of
47Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker. 75.
48Oswald Spengler, "Nietzsche and His Century,” as quoted in Steven Aschheim,
The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany. 20.
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Frederick. But it turned out Hthat he was deceived . .  . and his 
skepticism (once mistaken for the Enlightenment variety) was of 
audacious manliness, which is related most closely to genius for war 
and conquest and which first entered Germany in the person of 
Frederick the Great" (BGE 139). Nietzsche believed that the 
Germans as a nation benefited from the ethic of militarism 
introduced by Frederick. Few others thinkers have dared to make 
this argument.
Ansell-Pearson says that "Nietzsche understands politics as 
being neither individualistic nor collectivistic."49 Extreme 
nationalism reflects a culture's loss of creativity but in the modem 
world, a militarism with a complete lack of nationalism would be 
meaningless. And without some form of militarism, the greatest 
existences cannot be complete. "One has renounced the great life 
when one has renounced war" (TWI 489). It has often been said that 
Nietzsche gave up his mystical Wagnerian militarism after his 
grotesque experiences as a field-hospital orderly in the Franco- 
Prussian War, and that he became a pacifist.50 This is evidently 
absurd after reading any of his works. Nietzsche even discussed the 
possibility of a duel with his former friend Paul Ree in 1880. He 
was thirty-five. In one of his last writings, Nietzsche stated that 
"since I do not by any means share the unwarlike views of my friend 
Galiani, I am not afraid of predicting a few things and thus, of 
conjuring up the cause of wars" (WP 81).
Nietzsche prescribed no necessary ends for his militarism. 
Here, Nietzsche's bias for instinct over reason stands plain.
Militarism as a way of life, as a good in itself, should not be 
distinguished by a logocentric conception of war as a necessary evil 
only in the service of progress, and the end of all wars. War is only 
another mode of Western decadence when it is waged to "good" 
ends. "You say it is the good cause that hallow even war? I say unto 
you: it is the good war that hallows any cause. War and courage 
have accomplished more great things than love of the neighbor. Not
49Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker.
150.
5°Ibid., 26.
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your pity but your courage has so far saved the unfortunate" (ZAR 
159). Militarism flourishes in Nietzsche's writing as an alternative 
to universalism in all its forms, but particularly Christianity. "All of 
the deities on Olympus would have had occasion for immortal 
laughter: Cesare Borgia for Pope. Am I understood? Well then, 
that would have been the victory which alone I crave today: with 
that, Christianity would have been abolished" (ATC 654). Without 
question, no "post-modern," or postmodern Nietzschean world 
would be complete without warfare, literally.
Nietzsche's love of warfare also underscores his general 
suspicion of the intelligensia. "My brothers, drive the dogs away 
from him (the hero), the lazy creepers, and all the ravenous vermin- 
-all the raving vermin of the 'educated,' who feast on every hero's 
sweat" (ZAR 320). Modernity has fostered an environment in which 
war cannot be waged except as a tool for an ultimately pacifistic end. 
The innately irrational nature o f  war, as with all extra-rational 
natural events, become questioned in hyper-logical settings, 
especially academia. Nietzsche's militarism, then, exists in direct 
contrast to rationalism, as well as any form of pacifism. The Nazis 
adopted all of these Nietzschean struggles. The spirit of Nietzsche's 
admiration for the dazzlingly-clad Greek warrior was captured in 
the symbolism of "fascist" grandeur. "The Marxist critic Walter 
Benjamin denounced the aestheticization of violence in fascist 
glorifications of World War I, an aestheticization he would later see 
as emblematic of the fascist approach to politics."51
Nietzsche's conception of life is cyclical. "Progress" is a 
fiction; nothing can grow without taxing something else. All is a 
zero sum game. If something declines, its antithesis invariably fills 
its vacuum. Heroism and pacifism are opposites, and cannot flourish 
concomitantly. The fruits of rationalism and irrationalism cannot be 
harvested in the same season. The master cannot thrive except at the 
expense of slaves. In all eternal struggles, one side is always gaining 
ground. Lack of action hastens the victory of one's antipode as life 
is always moving. Hitler recognized and used the eternal-diametrical
51 Edward Dimondberg, Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, The Weimar Source Book. 145.
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model to which Nietzsche contributed immensely. "Hitler was able 
to attract neoconservative intellectuals who rejected the rationalism 
and flabby liberalism of the modem world in favor of a Nietzschean 
irrationalism, heroic man in place of economic man."52 The 
reclamation of the warrior ethic took on a plethora of forms in the 
Third Reich. Germans students, especially boys, participated in one 
of the most physically demanding compulsory fitness movements in 
history. Says Aschheim, "For the Nazis, the decadent and feminized 
nineteenth century was to give way to a new masculine warrior-age, 
one that regarded Nietzsche as a pioneer of the German rediscovery 
of the body."53
Nietzsche's admiration for the Greeks and Greek attention to 
physical beauty was interpreted by the Nazis, with much legitimacy, 
as another calling to the creation of a higher racial type. The 
Germans should harden their bodies in order to prepare them selves, 
for domination, to show themselves worthy of domination, and to 
recapture the discipline of physical pain that masters must endure for 
victory. Said Hitler, "Not a day should pass during which the 
young man is not trained physically for at least one hour in the 
morning and again in the evening, in every kind of sport and 
gymnastics, sp o rt. . . promotes the spirit of aggression in the same 
measure, and demands determination quick as lightning, and educates 
the body for steel-like versatility."54 In a speech to the officers of 
three Waffen SS divisions, Himmler spurred his best men to imbue 
the army with the Nazi Weltanschauung. "I beg you as commanding 
officers, as chiefs and leaders, to instruct your men again and again 
in our ideological beliefs . . .  I ask you to look after them, and guide 
them, and not let them go before they are really saturated with our 
spirit and are fighting like the old guard fo u g h t. . . We have only 
one task—to stand firm and carry on the racial struggle without 
m ercy."55
52Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives.225.
53Steven E. Aschheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany. 238.
54Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 616.
55Robert E. Herzstein, Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich. 246.
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In a Nietzschean sense, the Nazis recognized the ascendancy of . 
the warrior ethic as the only alternative to the increasing ascendancy 
of a feminized-pacifism. As if carrying a banner for the masculine- 
warrior instinct, the Nazis viciously attacked the leftist ideal of a 
peaceable humanity. To Hitler, the Weimar Republic suffered from 
"a lack of determination and courage that tries to conceal itself under 
the cloak of a humanitarian attitude."56 Similarly, Nietzsche's 
assault on humanitarianism, and its ideological kin, inevitably 
followed his advocacy of cultures based on courage and the pitiless 
warrior existence.
56Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 198.
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Chapter IV: Conclusion
A practical instruction and demonstratio ad absurdium 
would not strike me as undesirable even if it were 
gained and paid for with a tremendous expenditure of 
human lives. In any case, even as a restless mole under 
the soil of a society that wallows in stupidity, socialism 
will be able to be something useful and therapeutic: it 
delays 'peace on earth' and the total mollification of the 
democratic herd animal; it forces the Europeans to 
retain spirit, namely cunning and cautious care, not to 
abjure manly and warlike virtues altogether, and to 
retain some remnant of spirit, o f clarity, sobriety, and 
coldness of the spirit—it protects Europe for the time 
being from the marasmus feminismus that threatens it 
(WP 78).
It could be argued that the Nazi experiment was the
"demonstration of absurdity” desired by Nietzsche, but at no point
did he literally call for a Holocaust. Without question, the idea that
Nietzsche provided the perfect philosophical avenue for the Nazi
train of thought is indefensible. Nationalism, socialism, Wagnerian
symbolism, anti-Semitism, mass culture, and the Germans themselves
were disapproved of by Nietzsche. The boorish hyperbole of any
political party could not incorporate his elegant, subtle, and eclectic
wisdom on most points. In comparison with the Nazis' artifice,
transcendent artistic creativity played a small role in their "will to
power." "Estimated merely for his value for Germany and German
culture, Richard Wagner remains a great question mark, perhaps a
German misfortune, in any case a destiny" (WP 67). Also, Hitler
aimed at greater civilization, in spite of his barbarism, while
Nietzsche had other plans.
The great moments of culture were always, morally 
speaking, times of corruption; and conversely, the 
periods when the taming of the human animal 
("civilization") was desired and enforced were times of 
intolerance against the boldest and most spiritual 
natures. Civilization has aims different from those of 
culture—perhaps they are even opposite (WP 75).
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Still, whether Hitler advocated the renewal of "civilization" or 
not, he regarded himself as the type of predatory human that 
Nietzsche repeatedly advocated. If "the great moments of culture 
were always, morally speaking, times of corruption," then how 
might Nietzsche have interpreted the Nazi experiment as anything 
but a high moment in the rebirth of culture? Compared with the 
Nazis, no experiment ever attempted has so violently rejected the 
morality of its civilization. By these particular Nietzschean criteria, 
the Nazis conducted a desirable experiment.
A literal reading of Nietzsche eliminates him as the intellectual 
father of National Socialism, because he rejected nationalism, 
socialism, and so much else of what the Nazis stood for. Yet such a 
reading demands that any ideological comparison between Nietzsche 
and any political party requires an issue by issue agreement between 
the two. Marx and Lenin disagreed on the required historical stages 
before world revolution, the role of a ruling elite party, and the 
status of farmers in communist society. Yet dismissing the obvious 
connections between Marx and Lenin based on these and other 
differences would seem academically dishonest. Comparisons 
between Marx and Lenin generally benefit from a likening of their 
similarities rather than a fixation on their differences. Scholars do 
not need to be shown an issue by issue agreement between Marx and 
Lenin to recognize that they reside in the same ideological 
constellation. Yet in an attempt to distance all ideas of value from 
National Socialism, the scholarly establishment has chosen to treat 
comparisons between Nietzsche and the Nazis much more literally, 
and with far less nuance than equivalent comparisons between Marx 
and Lenin.
The fact remains that very few people today claim to have 
anything in common with the Nazis, ideologically or otherwise. This 
makes any ideological common ground between them and Nietzsche 
particularly conspicuous. Since the late nineteenth century, very few 
thinkers have seriously questioned the values of the French 
Revolution, let alone mocked and castigated them. None besides 
Nietzsche and the extreme right have posited militarism as a value in
96
itself. Only Nietzsche and the right have extolled the necessity of 
spiritual aristocracy, attention to breeding, and the role of race in 
any healthy culture. Only they have questioned the legitimacy of 
Christian (Hegelian), Marxist, and liberal notions of progress. 
Hardness, heartlessness, the possibility of rebirth through 
destruction, the purity of violence, the necessity of exclusion: these 
are the uncommon ethical values upon which both Nietzsche's and 
the Nazis' new European orders were to be built. Nietzsche and the 
Nazis are distinguished much more by method than by spirit. While 
they differ in the tools they would use to mold their post-decadent 
worlds, they obviously hale from the same rare ideological 
stratosphere.
Oddly, Nietzsche and the Nazis shared much ideologically, but 
also differed much in form. This begs the question: In spite of so 
many similarities in their visions for a future European culture, how 
could the Nazis have so grotesquely mistreated the Jews both 
ideologically and physically, while Nietzsche generally gives them 
fair treatment? This results directly from the Nazis' mind-numbing 
nationalist debauch, repeatedly warned against by Nietzsche. The 
Nazis' maniacal obsession with (as opposed to Nietzsche's cultured 
interest in) physical types prohibited them from being even the 
slightest bit inclusive. The chasm that separates them on this issue 
stems from the different realms of being in which they interested 
themselves. Differences in method must inevitably distinguish those 
such as Nietzsche who only exist in the sphere of ideas, and those like 
the Nazis who try to turn radical ideals into reality. Action always 
requires concessions from one's most ethereal dreams. Practicality 
softens the rigid dogma which often accompanies an ideology in its 
purest form. When Nietzsche says that "nationalism and protective 
tariffs may appear sanctioned in the light" [of perpetuating stronger 
types] (WP 386) he makes a rare appearance in the cold waters of 
practicality. At such times, his ideas tends to mirror the Nazis even 
more. The project of creating a higher human' type is a grandiose 
one. The necessities of operating politically in the modem world to 
achieve grandiose ends confine one to a very narrow range of 
political possibilities. Revolutionizing even one people's
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consciousness could not be accomplished in the free, artistically 
liberal climate that Nietzsche advocated. In his rarer moments, he 
acknowledged the necessary evil of conducting any experiment for a 
higher type of man within the more controlled environment of a 
nationalistic or socialistic society.
In fact, Nietzsche's dreams, stripped of the luxury of their 
idealism, bore many striking similarities to the visions of the Nazis. 
The perfect human being, heroism, valor, glory, the warrior ethic, 
the end of modernity, and cultural regeneration all look much 
prettier between two covers in a book than they do when 
encumbered by the imperfections of human action. Nietzsche seldom 
stooped to incorporate banal human necessities into his visions of 
human regeneration. Nietzsche barely skimmed the surface of 
necessity and harsh reality in his writings, and for this very reason, 
many of his tracts seem foreign to the grisly realities of the Third 
Reich.
In Nietzsche's dreams, warriors do not need latrines. His 
grand aesthetic spectacles do not include factories for the production 
of rubber-soled boots. Nietzsche's Supermen fill their stomachs with 
ambrosia, not with lean potato soup. His wars are fought with 
swords forged in magma, not with tanks drowned in mud. In 
reality, warriors kill people, masters enslave people, and rapacity 
requires wailing, pathetic victims. Unbridled instincts result in 
unimagined crimes. Had Nietzsche tempered his dreams with the 
world as it existed around him and still chosen to embrace his own 
values, his visions would have looked much more like Hitler's 
realities.
This essay has addressed itself to the following question: If 
forced to steep his dreams in the realities of modern, mechanized 
conquest, just how different would Nietzsche's visions have been 
from those of the Nazis? If shrouded in a gray tunic instead of a 
coat of dazzling mail, are Nietzsche's idealizations of "conquest, 
vendetta, revenge, ambition," and "the will to power" really so 
different from those o f the Nazis? Such components of Nietzsche's 
master morality could not, under any circumstances, be realized 
cleanly. Caught in a sea of barbed-wire, land-mines, and refugees,
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might necessity have moved Nietzsche to excuse the Nazis for their 
socialism, nationalism, and their reliance on the state? T o  the degree 
that Nietzsche and his ilk were right in their criticisms of modernity, 
Hitler's profound immoralism and willingness to act were bound to 
appear.
Evil
This leaves Nietzsche's famous advocacy of things "evil" as a 
"final solution" to the modem malaise. What else could Nietzsche 
have intended by statements such as "the great epochs of our life are 
the occasions when we gain the courage to rebaptize our evil 
qualities as our best qualities" (BGE 97)? When Nietzsche challenges 
us all to get "beyond good and evil," he means that all of our 
impulses deserve a place in the natural order, even those drives now 
deemed "evil." Only when we overcome all of our moral taboos can 
life again become full.
The states in which we infuse a transfiguration and 
fullness into things and poeticize about them until they 
reflect back our fullness and joy in life: sexuality; 
intoxication; feasting; spring; victory over an enemy, 
mockery; bravado; cruelty; the ecstasy of religious 
feeling. Three elements principally: sexuality, 
intoxication, cruelty—all belonging to the oldest festal 
joys  of mankind (WP 421).
Nietzsche's image could easily be used to buttress any argument in 
favor of paganism. Sensual indulgence is not just encouraged, it 
anchors his ideal new world. Nietzsche clearly views the lust for 
conquest as one of these natural human impulses. While indulging 
the instincts may not seem a radical concept, the application of such 
an idea would be revolutionary. Nietzsche is right to recognize that 
the consequences for those unprepared for such people would indeed 
be "evil." Nietzsche reminds his readers that the truths contained in 
evil are hidden from those claiming to represent the "good" in the 
modem world. "Everything that the good call evil must come 
together so that one truth may be bom. O my brothers, are you evil
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enough for this truth? The audacious daring, the long mistrust, the 
cruel No, the disgust, the cutting into the living—how rarely does all 
this come together. But from such seed is truth begotten" (ZAR 
312).
Ultimately, Nietzsche views the fear of evil as the very fear of 
the fullness of life. Those feeble souls who say yes to perpetually 
less of what they see will find evil under every stone and around 
every comer. "The good man sees himself as if surrounded by evil, 
and under the continual onslaught of evil his eye grows keener, he 
discovers evil in all his dreams and desires; and so he ends, quite 
reasonably, by considering nature evil, mankind corrupt, goodness 
an act of grace. In summa, he denies life" (WP 193). Strong men, 
on the contrary, see no evil. They see their opponents only in terms 
of their relative strength. The strong view life as an eternal 
competition. This is how Nietzsche ends The Will to Power: "This 
world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves 
are also this will to power—and nothing besides" (WP 550)! To say 
that "I love Zarathustra for the sake of my evil spirit" (ZAR 409) is 
to acknowledge Zarathustra's allure as an unexplored world of 
ignored wisdom, the wisdom of Zoroaster, the wisdom of ancient 
pagan instinct, the wisdom of bloodlust, and the wisdom of evil.
"We resist the idea that all great human beings have been 
criminals (only in the grand and not in the miserable style), that 
crime belongs to greatness" (WP 320). Armed with pure instinct, 
Nietzsche's advocacy of evil, and the idea that crimes committed on a 
grand scale may well constitute greatness, Hitler likely found 
justification for his actions through Nietzsche. And not just for the 
Holocaust. The revaluation of values is deemed a futuristic event at 
times, but one of the utmost urgency at others. "The time has come 
for man to set himself a goal . . . Alas, the time is coming when man 
will no longer shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man, and the 
string of his bow will have forgotten how to whir" (ZAR 129)! 
Clearly, Nietzsche fears that the pacifistic herd animal of the modem 
world has no goal, only a "progressive" illusion, that will soon 
render sterile the soil out of which higher goals can grow. Through
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such prophesies, Hitler received the blessing of a  great mind to act 
not just with great "evil," but to act quickly as well.
The new will to power shall not be a search for an equal place 
in the family of nations. "It is quite in order that we possess no 
religion of oppressed Aryan races, for that is a contradiction: a 
master race is either on top or it is destroyed" (WP 93). The will to 
power should not be interpreted simply as the maniacal quest of one 
individual over others. "All great men want to imbed themselves in 
great communities; they want to give a single form to the 
multifarious and disordered; chaos stimulates them . . .  To gain that 
tremendous energy of greatness in order to shape the man of the 
future through breeding and, on the other hand, the annihilation of 
millions of failures, and not to perish of the suffering one creates, 
though nothing like it has ever existed" (WP 506)! The great 
community shall be constituted of the superior in every way, the 
dominant, the born master. "Among men too a hot sun hatches a 
beautiful breed. And there are many wonderful things in those who 
are evil" (ZAR 255). No one who reads Nietzsche should believe 
that all this "evil" is perpetuated to no end. Nietzsche's desired ends 
are demonstrated from his first work of The Birth o f Tragedy right 
through The Will to Power. "The profound poet tells us that a man 
who is truly noble is incapable of sin; though every law, every 
natural order, indeed the entire canon of ethics, perish by his actions, 
those very actions will create a circle of higher consequences able to 
found a new world on the ruins of the old" (BT 60).
Hitler also wished to found a new world on the ruins of the 
old. The hidden value to destruction is the necessity of renewal. To 
give purpose to his destruction and rebirth, Hitler necessarily 
followed Nietzsche's example of "advocated taking exceedingly tough 
steps against the agents of degeneration."1 Eradicating the herd 
animal, its shepherds, and the slavish ethics of Christianity mandated 
taking many of the "tough steps" for which Hitler is now famous. 
And no one could envision himself more qualified for the "artistic 
refashioning of mankind" than Hitler. The frustrated artist finally
1Steven E. Aschheim, "Nordau, Nietzsche, and Regeneration," 652.
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found his niche on a grand, pre-ordained scale. Hitler would be the - 
artist of Europe's post-decadent society. The SS would be 
Nietzsche's cruel, pitiless, dazzling warriors. Through 
totalitarianism, Hitler sought to create Nietzsche's single will by 
means of a new caste dominating all Europe, with a "protracted, 
terrible will of its own which could set its objectives thousands of 
years ahead" (BGE 138). Therein lay Hitler's Thousand Year Reich.
To replace Nietzsche's "mixed race man, on the whole a small- 
souled man," (BGE 121) Hitler wished to repopulate the east with 
blond-haired, blue-eyed couples who were spiritually outfitted for 
mastery and conquest. To replace the tamed, Christian herd animals 
of Nietzsche's chagrin, Hitler planned a homogenized officer corps, 
but one capable of unbridled will, savagery, and predatory acts of 
cruelty. The officer of the Reich was supposed to embody the 
discipline, single-mindedness, rapaciousness, and keen intellect of the 
Overman. The Third Reich came prematurely and far less 
beautifully than Nietzsche would have liked to imagine. Still,
Nietzsche clearly provided the vivid images resulting in Hitler's all-
too concrete spectacles. rrveviKofO '
In Mein Kampf, Hitler never mentionecfNietzsche. This w 'P&SSiwq 1 
conspicuous omission, along with the infamously poor writing of 
Mein Kampf \ suggest that Hitler seldom if ever consciously imitated 
Nietzsche. Yet many of Hitler's dreams for the regeneration of the 
German people echoed Nietzsche's dreams for the regeneration of 
Western Culture. Despite his assertion that the Germans constitute 
the heartland of the master race, Hitler criticized the Germans in 
many of the same ways that Nietzsche did. He also spurred them to 
move forward in Nietzschean terms. Hitler condemned the Germans 
for their "inner decay," which "had remained hidden and invisible to 
the eyes of most people, or which like ostriches people did not want 
to see."2 On these grounds, they deserved to lose World War I.
Controlled by the "bourgeois voting cattle" of the parliamentary 
system, the Germans had allowed their "spiritual backbone" to
2 Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 229-230.
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soften.3 Nietzsche agreed with all of these observations about the 
state of German culture.
To "conserve" the nation for the coming conflict, at once a 
grand Nietzschean revenge for the Germans and a revaluation of 
their values, Hitler wished to enliven the Volk in the mean time. 
Hitler, like Nietzsche, would have been impressed with any nation 
whose virtues came close to the ancient Greeks. "What makes the 
Greek ideal of beauty a model is the wonderful combination of the 
most magnificent physical beauty, with a brilliant mind and the 
noblest soul."4 These were Hitler's words, not Nietzsche's. In Mein 
Kampf, Hitler makes clear his passion for the eventual, grand 
cultivation of the German intellect. Unlike Nietzsche, Hitler's goals 
did not permit him to await the perfect combination of 
circumstances. As he lived much more in the world of action than 
did Nietzsche, Hitler could not wait millenia for the cultivation of a 
Nietzschean race of supra-intellectual aristocratic-warriors.
Unlike Nietzsche, Hitler had to wage war first, and 
appropriate resources for the cultivation of perfect human beings, if 
at all, later. "First struggle and then we shall see what can be done. 
Otherwise mankind has passed the high point of its development and 
the end is not the domination of any ethical idea but barbarism and 
consequently chaos."5 Hitler, like Nietzsche, imagined utopias free 
of unbridled barbarism and graced by perfectly aesthetic and 
cultivated human beings. But the modem world provided a hostile 
reception for the "revaluation of values" in a Nietzschean, or 
Hitlerian fashion. Struggle against the modern world, the most 
powerful force created in human history, had to come immediately 
and with full force or it would never come. Consequently, Hitler's 
legions and workers went into the field of battle against the modem 
world with only a whiff of the cultivation required for a super-race.
With a hint of pitiless barbarism, Hitler's Germany rose to the 
challenge of destroying Western ethical conceptions as Nietzsche
3Ibid, 341.
4Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf. 408.
5Ibid., 288.
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portrayed them. But munitions factories, shipyards, potato fields, 
coal mines, steel mills, and even the autobahn would not have suited 
Nietzsche's dreams for the aesthetic achievements of the Superman. 
Nationalism, socialism, anti-Semitism, and the ruinous tactics of the 
Nazis lacked all of the beauty of Nietzsche's prose. The nascent state 
of the German revolt against the modem world could not conform to 
Nietzsche's high aesthetic, intellectual, or spiritual expectations.
Like a Wagnerian opera, the Germans' battle against the modern 
world never hinted of Nietzsche's more subtle and eternal truths.
Yet uncoordinated though their performance may have been, the 
Nazis' nascent experiment took its inspiration from Nietzsche. In a 
plethora of ways, they learned what to oppose in the modem world 
through him. And, common to the relationship between master and 
pupil, Nietzsche and the Nazis were separated more by skill, 
development, and genius than by their goals for the future of the 
world.
Two vital distinctions emerge from this research. One, some 
context and substance has been added to the debate that never was, 
but perhaps still can be. Two, it should now be clear that the 
similarities and dissimilarities between Nietzsche and the Nazis are 
not bland and accidental, but quite striking. Where they differ 
ideologically, huge chasms seem to emerge. Where they share 
ground, they occupy a hidden valley of thought into which few 
others have even peeked. Given this odd juxtaposition of facts, one 
can easily see how scholars could focus on one very evident side of 
the issue or the other and form very rigid opinions. To avoid this, a 
very nuanced, balanced, and sober approach to the topic of Nietzsche 
and the Nazis is required.
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